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Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, is among the world’s most 
polarizing political figures.2 To some, he is a heroic military leader who 
stopped Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, then transformed himself into to a 
politician and guided his people toward peace and prosperity.3  To 
																																																																																																																												
2. See Jeffrey Gettleman, The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 4, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?mcubz=3 
[https://perma.cc/24W6-UEBR] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); see also infra notes 110-21 and 
accompanying text. 
3. See PATRICIA CRISAFULLI & ANDREA REDMOND, RWANDA, INC.: HOW A DEVASTATED 
NATION BECAME AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD 92 (2012) (arguing 
Paul Kagame has the attributes of a successful corporate CEO, that he runs Rwanda like a 
business, and that the country’s success is due to his leadership); see also STEPHEN KINZER, A 
THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA’S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO DREAMED IT 337 (2008) (arguing 
that Kagame is the “man of the hour in modern Africa”); Philip Gourevitch, Letter from the 
Congo: Continental Shift, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 1997), at 42 (praising Kagame as a new type 
of African leader); infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
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others, he is a bloodthirsty dictator who deploys his army to pillage 
neighboring countries and his security forces to intimidate, imprison, 
or assassinate all who question his rule.4 This article will not resolve 
the question of whether Paul Kagame is a savior or a villain. It is 
possible, of course, that he is both. It will, however, confirm that the 
Kagame regime is engaged in a comprehensive, sophisticated effort to 
reprogram Rwandans’ collective memory and thereby legitimize its 
increasingly dictatorial rule. 
The US government and its people should care about what 
happens in Rwanda. The obligation is based partly on history. In 1994, 
US actions and inactions exacerbated a slaughter that killed an 
estimated 800,000 human beings.5 The US obligation is also based on 
contemporary geopolitics. At present, the United States gives Rwanda 
approximately US$200 million in aid every year, making us by far its 
largest bilateral donor.6 If our money is going to Rwanda, and if the 
Rwandan government is oppressing its own people, we are at least 
indirectly complicit. 
Legal scholars and human rights activists who have written about 
political oppression in contemporary Rwanda tend to focus on what 
Americans would consider “First Amendment” concerns, particularly 
the Kagame regime’s aggressive silencing of perceived political 
opponents.7 This paper argues that this “freedom of expression” lens is 
																																																																																																																												
4. See Briefing, Paul Kagame, feted and feared, THE ECONOMIST (July 15, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21724982-rwanda-more-prosperous-country-ever-
it-also-repressed-one-paul-kagame [https://perma.cc/CK97-CCX8] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); 
see also Howard W. French, The Case Against Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, NEWSWEEK 
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/case-against-rwandas-president-paul-kagame-
63167 [https://perma.cc/FA8P-W42N] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (quoting the Rwanda scholar 
Filip Reyntjens as claiming President Kagame is “probably the worst war criminal in office 
today”); infra notes 119-26. 
5. See infra notes 91-96 (discussing the US’s role in facilitating the Rwandan genocide; 
see also infra note 78 (discussing disagreement about the exact number of dead). 
6 . See Compare your country: Aid statistics by donor, recipient and sector, 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr=302&lg=en&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/XF6V-6RY2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (showing the US as Rwanda’s largest 
governmental donor at almost $200 million per year). 
7. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Allen & George H. Norris, Is Genocide Different?: Dealing with 
Hate Speech in a Post-Genocide Society, 7 J. OF INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 146, 147 (2011); Yakare-
Oule (Nani) Jansen, Denying Genocide or Denying Free Speech? A Case Study of the 
Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, 12 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 191, 191 (2014); 
Joseph Sebarenzi, Justice and Human Rights for All Rwandans, in REMAKING RWANDA: STATE 
82 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:79 
too narrow to understand fully what is taking place in Rwanda today. 
Instead, the paper borrows theoretical concepts from historiography 
and memory studies, and argues that Rwanda’s government is 
surpassing mere suppression of speech and instead is engaging in a 
tightly managed effort to establish and enforce a fanciful version of 
history that legitimizes the Kagame regime’s increasingly autocratic 
rule. The regime, to the extent it admits its actions, justifies them as 
necessary to maintain stability and avoid a repeat of the country’s 
horrific genocide. 8  But abundant evidence indicates that President 
Kagame is tailoring memory and history not to maintain stability, but 
to keep himself and his ruling coterie in power. 
The Rwandan government’s program of “memory 
entrepreneurship” 9  relies partly on law as a tool for political 
oppression, but understanding the full scope of the oppression requires 
explorations beyond the realm of law. Part II of the paper will begin 
with history, providing an overview of Rwanda that focuses particular 
attention on the years leading up to the 1994 genocide. Part III will 
introduce helpful theoretical concepts from historiography and 
memory studies, and then will deploy those concepts in examining 
competing versions of Rwanda’s history: the self-serving narrative 
insisted upon by the Kagame regime, and the narrative generally agreed 
upon by historians and other scholars. Part IV turns back to law, 
describing the legal (and in some cases, extralegal) methods Rwanda’s 
government uses to enforce its self-justifying, ahistorical narrative. Part 
V concludes by positing that the Rwandan government’s efforts to 
control history and memory are a symptom of creeping dictatorship. 
Even allowing for the fact that strong leadership is needed in a country 
that suffered a horrific genocide less than a generation ago, its actions 
																																																																																																																												
BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 343-49 (Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf 
eds., 2011). 
8 . See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA: JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: THE FIRST 
INSTANCE TRIAL OF VICTOIRE INGABIRE 9 (2013); see also Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 
147 (arguing that the government restricts speech to avoid reigniting the conflict); Scott Straus 
& Lars Waldorf, Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra 
note 7, at 8 (arguing the regime’s central justification is that the prior social order produced the 
genocide, so radical social change is needed to prevent a future reoccurrence); Laura Seay, Is 
Rwanda’s Authoritarian State Sustainable?, WASHINGTON POST (June 3, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/03/is-rwandas-
authoritarian-state-sustainable/ [https://perma.cc/F3GV-P5NM] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) 
(similar). 
9. See generally infra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining the term “memory 
entrepreneurship”). 
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appear to be more geared toward maintaining power than maintaining 
peace. 
II.  RWANDA, ITS GENOCIDE, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENT 
PAUL KAGAME 
Most non-specialists know one thing about Rwanda, which is that 
in 1994 it experienced genocide. Later sections of this paper will 
closely analyze competing historical narratives about what caused the 
genocide and exactly what happened once it began. In the meantime, 
this section provides an overview relying on facts that are, at least for 
the most part, uncontested. 
Rwanda is a small, beautiful, hilly, landlocked, densely 
populated10 country in east Africa.11 Its economy relies on agricultural 
production and animal husbandry,12 though the government would like 
to shift over time toward an “information economy.”13 The country is 
populated by three “ethnic” groups: Hutu (85% of the population), 
Tutsi (14% of the population), and Twa (1% of the population).14 
																																																																																																																												
10. See John W. Bruce, Return of Land in Post-Conflict Rwanda: International Standards, 
Improvisation, and the Role of International Humanitarian Organizations, in LAND AND POST-
CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 121, 122 (Jon Unruh & Rhodri C. Williams eds., 2013) (arguing 
Rwanda has one of the highest ratios of people to arable land in the world); Catharine Newbury, 
High Modernism at the Ground Level: The Imidugudu Policy in Rwanda, in REMAKING 
RWANDA, supra note 7, at 223-24 [hereinafter Newbury, High Modernism] (arguing Rwanda 
has one of the highest population densities and lowest rates of urbanization in Africa); David 
Newbury & Catharine Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back in: Agrarian Themes in the 
Construction and Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 832, 837 
(2000) [hereinafter Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In] (arguing Rwanda is 
a tiny, densely packed country of 10,000 square miles – about the size of Vermont – with a 
current population of 7.5 million compared to Vermont’s 600,000). 
11. See Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-
Regions, and Selected Economic and Other Groupings, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm [https://perma.cc/JXH4-
AGDF] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
12. See Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 223 (arguing most Rwandans rely 
on agricultural production for their survival). 
13 . See generally KIGALI, REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND 
ECONOMIC PLANNING, RWANDA VISION 2020 (July 2000); An Ansoms, Rwanda’s Post-
Genocide Economic Reconstruction: The Mismatch Between Elite Ambitions and Rural 
Realities, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 240 [hereinafter Ansoms, Reconstruction] 
(arguing Rwanda’s government plans to transform from a “low human development” country to 
medium, as defined by the United Nations Human Development Index). 
14. See David Newbury, Understanding Genocide, 41 AFR. STUD. REV. 73, 78 (1998). 
David and Catharine Newbury argue the Twa, sometimes referred to as “pygmy,” are often 
overlooked in political analysis due to their low numbers and are “usually relegated to the status 
84 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:79 
However, as discussed in Part III.B and C, there is controversy over 
whether those groups are indeed different ethnicities since they speak 
a single language, 15  Kinyarwanda, and historically lived together, 
frequently intermarried, and worshiped the same gods.16 
Germany was Rwanda’s first colonial ruler but its influence on 
the country was limited and its tenure brief.17 After Germany’s loss in 
World War I, The League of Nations assigned Belgium as Rwanda’s 
European protector.18 Belgium settled in as a typical colonial ruler, 
imposing harsh policies similar to those implemented by other 
colonizing powers across Africa. They forced farmers to grow cash 
crops such as coffee, 19  which made those farmers vulnerable to 
																																																																																																																												
of exotic appendages to Rwandan society.” Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back 
In, supra note 10, at 840. 
15 . Language is an area of political contestation in Rwanda. French was Rwanda’s 
colonial language and until recently was the primary language of higher education and 
government. See Chris McGreal, Why Rwanda said adieu to French, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 
2009), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2009/jan/16/rwanda-english-genocide [https://
perma.cc/XP2L-JMLE] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). But in 2009, the Kagame regime announced 
an abrupt switch to English. Its purported reason was that English would facilitate economic 
integration with Rwanda’s English-speaking East African neighbors. Id. Others saw politics in 
the switch: Rwanda holds France partly responsible for the 1994 genocide and has taken steps 
to distance itself, including moving away from the French language. Id.; see also infra notes 48-
49, 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing France’s role in facilitating the genocide). Also, 
Paul Kagame and his ruling coterie grew up in exile in English-speaking countries, see infra 
note 85 and accompanying text, and their command of French is limited. Id. The disruptive effect 
of the switch was mitigated by the fact that all Rwandans speak Kinyarwanda and government 
business is often conducted in that language. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM 
YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 55 (1998) [hereinafter 
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU]. 
16. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 78. 
17. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which carved up Africa and awarded it to 
various European powers, assigned Rwanda and Burundi (then a single entity known as Ruanda-
Urundi and part of German East Africa) to Germany. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM 
YOU, supra note 15, at 57. However, because present-day Rwanda was remote and inaccessible, 
Germans did not actually arrive on the scene until 1897. Id. at 54. In 1922, after Germany’s loss 
in World War I, a League of Nations mandate assigned the territory to Belgium, which ruled in 
various forms until independence in 1961. Id. at 54, 61; Jean-Marie Kamatali, State Building in 
Rwanda, in RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE IN AFRICA 162 (George Klay Kieh, 
Jr. & Pita Ogaba eds., 2014). 
18. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 54, 61. 
19. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 862 
(arguing that by the end of the 1950s coffee represented more than 70% of the export earnings 
of Ruanda-Urundi); see also Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 226 (arguing Belgian 
colonists pushed coffee production and generally “intruded in rural production”). 
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famine. 20  They compelled their subjects to engage in burdensome 
forced labor, which placed further strain on household livelihoods.21 
They implemented a typical divide and conquer strategy by which they 
selected a minority group – in this case the Tutsi people – and favored 
them with education and official government positions while using 
them to rule over the majority – in this case mostly Hutu people.22 
Part III of this paper will discuss disagreements over whether the 
Tutsi and Hutu people are in fact distinct ethnic groups, but the 
Belgians assumed they were and they favored the Tutsi for reasons that 
strike modern ears as disturbingly racist. 23  The Tutsis, at least to 
Belgians eyes, were taller and had somewhat lighter skin, higher 
foreheads, thinner faces, and more aquiline noses.24 In other words, 
their features were closer to those of Europeans, which, the Belgians 
assumed, meant they had some northern blood running in their veins 
and, concomitantly, were superior to the supposedly darker, rounder, 
more compact Hutu.25 Beginning in the 1930s, the Belgians required 
																																																																																																																												
20. See Ansoms, Reconstruction, supra note 13, at 244 (arguing the Belgians imposed 
crops and that monocropping prevented farmers from diversifying to spread the risk of crop 
failure and uncontrollable market fluctuations); Thomas Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets Into 
Pigeon Holes: The Effects of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous 
Zarma Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 635, 651, n.73 (2002) (arguing that French-imposed 
cash cropping schemes led to famine in times of drought). 
21. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 57 (arguing that the 
Belgians imposed forced labor, mostly on Hutu subjects). There is now a rich English-language 
literature chronicling the Rwandan genocide. Philip Gourevitch, who was among the first 
American journalists to write about the genocide and its aftermath, is criticized by some scholars 
for getting parts of the story – including parts of Rwanda’s history – wrong. See, e.g., Jens 
Meierhenrich, Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation of “Lieux de 
Memoire” in Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 288 (arguing Gourevitch is a 
mere “casual observer of things Rwandan”). He also has been publicly chastised for glossing 
over allegations that the Kagame regime has committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. See, e.g., Jason Stearns & Federico Borello, Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan 
Crimes in the Congo, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 155 [hereinafter Stearns & 
Borello, Bad Karma] (arguing Gourevitch’s later writings on Rwanda unfairly stereotype Hutu 
refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo as collectively guilty of genocide). Still, 
Gourevitch’s book is, to my mind, the most thoroughly descriptive and engaging journalistic 
account of the genocide. 
22. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 51, 55-56. 
23. Id. at 55-56 (describing the racial and racist nature of European hypotheses about the 
origins of Hutus and Tutsis). 
24. Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 838-39. 
25. See id. at 839 (arguing that Europeans incorrectly considered the Hutu to be “short, 
sturdy, and dark,” in comparison to Tutsi); see also David Newbury, Canonical Conventions in 
Rwanda: Four Myths of Recent Historiography in Central Africa, 39 HIST. IN AFR. 41, 50 
(2012) [hereinafter Newbury, Canonical Conventions] (describing the racist “Hamitic 
86 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:79 
all Rwandans to obtain identity cards that, among other things, 
specified their ethnicity.26 These cards were still in use when the 1994 
genocide began and, tragically, helped make the slaughter more 
targeted and efficient.27 
In the 1950s, winds of change28 blew across the African continent, 
including Rwanda. For political and social reasons too complicated to 
parse here, Rwanda’s Hutu majority began in the late 1940s demanding 
full representation in governance, and the Belgian colonial regime, 
along with the Catholic church that helped rule the country,29 switched 
allegiance and began backing Hutu aspirations.30 As Rwandan Hutus 
asserted control, the Tutsi minority suffered systematic violence and 
deprivation. 31  Between 1959 and 1961, on the eve of Rwandan 
independence, Hutus engaged in widespread attacks against Tutsi 
people that killed many and destroyed countless homes.32 As a result, 
an estimated 250,000 Tutsis fled into exile, mostly to neighboring 
countries.33 This Tutsi diaspora played an important role in more recent 
Rwandan history, partly because Paul Kagame’s family was among the 
many who sought refuge in neighboring Uganda.34 
																																																																																																																												
Hypothesis” and arguing that Tutsis invoked it in support of their superiority while Hutus 
invoked it to show that they had prior claims to the land). 
26. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56-57. 
27. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 223 (arguing that 
identity cards had served as “death tickets” during the genocide); Linda Melvern, The Past is 
Prologue: Planning the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, in AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND 
BEYOND 22 (Philip Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2008). 
28. In 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his now famous “Wind 
of Change” speech in Cape Town, South Africa. See Frank Myers, Harold Macmillan’s “Winds 
of Change” Speech: A Case Study in Rhetoric of Policy Change, 3 RHETORIC AND PUB. AFF. 
555 (Winter 2000). He acknowledged that African nationalist aspirations were legitimate and 
that independence for African countries was inevitable. See id; see generally Ritchie Ovendale, 
Macmillan and the Winds of Change in Africa, 1957-1960, 38 THE HIST. J. 455 (June 1995). 
29. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56. 
30. See generally Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 
839 (describing the Hutu political emergence in the 1950s). 
31. Catherine Newbury & David Newbury, A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views 
of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 33 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 292, 297-99 (1999) [hereinafter 
Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass] (discussing ethnicity-based attacks on Tutsis and limits 
on Tutsi admission to schools and government jobs). 
32. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 59-60. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 211. 
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After gaining independence in 1961, Rwanda settled into a 
sustained period of Hutu rule and Tutsi deprivation. In 1973, the army 
chief of staff, a Hutu named Juvenal Habyarimana, launched a 
successful coup d’état against the sitting president, also a Hutu, and 
ruled until April 6, 1994, the day the genocide began.35 Habyarimana 
began as a comparative moderate in the matter of Hutu/Tutsi relations, 
but over time his regime became increasingly dominated by a group of 
hardliners associated with his wife, Agethe Habyarimana, and her clan 
from Rwanda’s northwestern region.36 Those hardliners were known as 
the akuzu (“little house” in Kinyarwanda) 37  and it was they who 
resisted reconciliation and power sharing with the Tutsi and who 
meticulously planned the genocide.38 
While Habyarimana was ruling Rwanda, Paul Kagame was 
gaining experience and influence in neighboring Uganda. 39  His 
professional and personal trajectory was fascinating and complicated, 
but for purposes of this overview it must suffice to say that he joined 
the Ugandan military, rose through the ranks, and eventually became 
its chief of military intelligence. 40  At the same time Kagame was 
serving the Ugandan army, he and a small group of Tutsi associates 
began laying plans to create their own army,41 one they planned to 
incubate from within the Ugandan army and then use to invade 
Rwanda, topple Habyarimana’s regime, make Rwanda safe for Tutsis, 
and permit the refugees’ return to their homeland. 42  This shadow 
military force eventually became associated with a Uganda-based 
political movement known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”).43 
By the late 1980s, the RPF army was in the process of splitting 
off from the Ugandan military in preparation for invading Rwanda.44 
In 1990, Kagame’s friend and RPF comrade in arms, Fred Rwigyema, 
led approximately 4,000 mostly Tutsi troops over the Ugandan border 
into northern Rwanda, marking the beginning of what some refer to as 
																																																																																																																												
35. Id. at 26. 
36. Id. at 76-77. 
37. Id. at 81. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 211, 213-14. 
40. Id. 
41. KINZER, supra note 3, at 47-52. 
42. Id. at 48-50. 
43. Id. at 50-51. 
44. Id. at 55. 
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the Rwandan Civil War.45 Rwigyema was killed soon after the start of 
the RPF advance 46  and his troops performed poorly. 47  Although 
Rwanda’s Hutu army, the Forces Armees Rwandaises (“FAR”), never 
enjoyed a reputation for battlefield prowess, 48  French troops 49 
bolstered the FAR by directly engaging and repelling the advancing 
Tutsis.50 
Upon Rwigyema’s death, Kagame took over control of the RPF 
army.51 He led its withdrawal into the remote and rugged Virunga 
Mountains in Rwanda’s extreme northwest and began a process of 
rigorous retraining and refitting.52 When the RPF army emerged from 
the mountains in early 1991 and began a series of hit and run attacks 
inside of Rwanda, it proved disciplined and fierce53 and made rapid 
progress against the FAR. By all accounts, Kagame was an extremely 
effective leader of his troops and a masterly military tactician and 
strategist.54 
By the early 1990s, pressure was mounting on President 
Habyarimana to democratize Rwanda and to treat Tutsis – including 
																																																																																																																												
45. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 217 (noting that 
Kagame was not present at the outbreak of hostilities because he was receiving military training 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). 
46. See id; KINZER, supra note 3, at 67. 
47. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 67, 78. 
48 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 77-78, 117 (arguing Rwanda’s national army was 
“notoriously inept”); DANIELA KROSLAK, THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
131 (2007) (arguing the French, who knew the Hutu army well, believe it “sclerotic” and 
incapable of winning the war on its own); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 
31, at 304 (similar). 
49. See generally infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (describing France’s support 
for the genocidal Habyarimana regime). 
50. See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 125 (referring to unproven rumors that French troops 
were directly involved in the war effort); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, 
supra note 15, at 89 (arguing that “hundreds of superbly equipped French paratroopers” kept the 
RPF from advancing); KINZER, supra note 3, at 77-78 (arguing the RPF’s defeat in 1990 was 
because “France had come to its client’s rescue”). 
51. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 217. 
52. See id. at 89 (arguing Kagame and the RPF trained his force into “a fierce and fiercely 
disciplined” guerilla army); KINZER, supra note 3, at 80-81 (arguing the RPF licked its wounds 
and reconstituted itself in the mountains). 
53 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 172 (arguing the RPF army was cohesive and 
disciplined). 
54.  See id. at 78, 97 (arguing Kagame was known to be a clear strategic thinker, brave 
fighter, and strict disciplinarian and that his first year leading the RPF army was a “resounding 
success”); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 218 (arguing 
that many consider Kagame’s 1994 military campaign a “work of plain genius”). 
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diaspora Tutsis – fairly. Part of that pressure resulted from world 
events.55 The United States and its allies had recently won the Cold 
War and new rules of the international game dictated that countries 
receiving aid, including Rwanda, would have to move rapidly toward 
democratic governance. 56  Pressure also resulted from the fact that 
Kagame and the RPF continued to demonstrate prowess on the 
battlefield.57 
In 1992, Kagame agreed to a ceasefire and committed to 
participating in negotiations to end the conflict.58 The talks took place 
primarily in Arusha, Tanzania, and resulted in a complicated power 
sharing agreement that became known as the Arusha Accords.59 For 
purposes of this overview, it must suffice to say that President 
Habyarimana reluctantly agreed to various compromises, but that he 
was consistently opposed and undermined by the akazu60 hardliners 
associated with his wife, Madam Agethe Habyarimana. 61  When it 
appeared that the Arusha process might actually succeed, they began 
planning62 their own final solution to what they viewed as Rwanda’s 
Tutsi problem.63 They stockpiled weapons64 and organized and trained 
local militias,65 including the infamous interahamwe, who were the 
																																																																																																																												
55. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89 (arguing that pressure 
from inside and outside Rwanda compelled President Habyarimana to democratize). 
56. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 82; Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80. 
57. See KINZNER, supra note 3, at 103-04 (discussing the RPF’s military success and Paul 
Kagame’s threat of further military action to strengthen his hand in the Arusha negotiations).  
58. KINZER, supra note 3, at 103. 
59. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 99; Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89-90 (arguing that the Arusha Accords did not 
really require democratization and instead merely committed to power sharing among Hutu and 
Tutsi political elites). 
60. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 14, at 99; Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 79, 89. 
61. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 337; see also GOUREVITCH, 
WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 80-82 (arguing the akazu “tightened its grip on the 
machinery of state” in reaction President Habyarimana’s agreement to democratize); KINZER, 
supra note 3, at 92 (arguing Habyarimana was simultaneously pressured by France to 
democratize and the akazu to crack down); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 
31, at 294-96 (similar). 
62. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 294-96. 
63. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 94 (arguing by 1994 Hutus 
were using the term “final solution”); KINZER, supra note 3, at 104, 109 (same). 
64. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 337 (arguing the hardliners 
stockpiled more than a half million machetes, one for every third Hutu adult male in Rwanda). 
65. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 93.  
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most prominent of the militias that carried out a great deal of the 
killing. 66  They compiled lists of prominent Tutsis and politically 
moderate Hutus who would be the first to die.67 And they implemented 
a comprehensive media strategy, relying primarily on radio and 
newspapers, to dehumanize Tutsis and prepare Hutu civilians for the 
work of exterminating their neighbors.68 
On April 6, 1994, a missile felled an airplane carrying President 
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, Cyprien Ntaryamira, as it 
was returning to Kigali after a round of consultations in Tanzania.69 
Nobody has proved who shot down the plane.70 Many, including the 
present-day Rwandan government, claim that Hutu akazu hardliners 
ordered the downing knowing it would furnish an excuse to implement 
the final solution.71 Others blame Paul Kagame and the RPF.72 What 
no one disputes is that the genocide began within minutes of the plane’s 
impact.73 
																																																																																																																												
66. Id. at 93 (arguing the interahamwe were “first among [the] militias”); Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 91-92 (describing the recruitment and actions of 
local militias). 
67. See MICHAEL N. BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
RWANDA 77-78 (2002) (arguing the hardliners stockpiled weapons, made lists, and organized 
death squads); GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 93, 114 (referring to 
kill lists drawn up by the interahamwe militias and the Presidential Guard); Samantha Power, 
Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Power, Bystanders to 
Genocide], http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/
304571/ [https://perma.cc/88JG-NQKP] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing Hutu hardliners 
had prepared kill lists and that Radio Mille Collines broadcast names, addresses, and license-
plate numbers of those who would be targeted first). 
68. See Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 149; see  also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM 
YOU, supra note 15, at 85-88, 95 (describing the akazu’s use of media to dehumanize Tutsis); 
KINZER, supra note 3, at 109-110 (arguing the akazu used radio broadcasts, particularly by 
Radio-Television Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM) to stir hatred and instruct on how to kill with 
homemade weapons); Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295 (similar). 
69. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 137-38; Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 
14, at 79. 
70 . See Lars Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide: The RPF’s Campaign Against 
Genocide Ideology, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 50-51 [hereinafter Waldorf, 
Instrumentalizing Genocide] (describing recent conflicting accounts of who was responsible). 
71. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 113 (arguing akazu 
hardliners were the most likely culprits); KINZNER, supra note 3, at 139.  
72.  See KINZER, supra note 3, at 139; see also Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, 
supra note 70, at 50 (arguing that French anti-terrorist Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere charged 
Kagame and his top military advisors with bringing down the plane). 
73. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80; see also GOUREVITCH, 
WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 113 (arguing “the organizers of the genocide were 
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The killing began in Kigali as the akazu and their collaborators 
hunted down and slaughtered the individuals on their carefully 
prepared lists.74 Among the first to die was Agathe Uwilingiyimana, 
the politically moderate Hutu prime minister75 who would have, had 
she lived, been sworn in as the head of state after Habyarimana’s 
death.76 
The slaughter spread to the countryside, often organized and led 
by the interahamwe militias.77 Over a period of one hundred days, an 
estimated 800,000 78  Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu 79  were 
murdered. Much of the killing was retail: there was little reported use 
of machine guns or bombs; most victims were chopped or bludgeoned 
to death by neighbors and acquaintances.80 The slaughter stopped only 
																																																																																																																												
primed to exploit [Habyarimana’s] death instantaneously”); KINZER, supra note 3, at 138 
(arguing that interahamwe had established roadblocks within an hour after the plane crash). 
74. See generally supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the compilation of kill 
lists); see also Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 49 
(2011) [hereinafter Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap] (arguing the brutal killing was led 
by the akazu and carried out by the national army, local militia groups, and ordinary citizens 
urged to kill by the government). 
75. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 114; Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 80. 
76.  See KINZER, supra note 3, at 140; see also SUSAN THOMSON, WHISPERING TRUTH 
TO POWER: EVERYDAY RESISTANCE TO RECONCILIATION IN POSTGENOCIDE RWANDA 48 
(2013) [hereinafter THOMSON, WHISPERING] (arguing the Hutu hardliners considered any Hutu 
who did not support the killing of Tutsis as “moderate”); Newbury, Understanding Genocide, 
supra note 13, at 80 (arguing the hardliners first targeted politically moderate Hutus). 
77. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 78, 81 (arguing the killing 
began in the capital and then “was directed throughout the country”). 
78. The butcher’s bill has never been definitively settled. Most published estimates claim 
800,000 deaths. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 133 (arguing 
800,000 is the “best estimate”); Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman, After Genocide, in AFTER 
A GENOCIDE, supra note 27, at xii (same). Some put the number of dead closer to 500,000. See 
Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 49 (arguing the genocide killed “more 
than a half million people”). Still others claim the correct number is more than a million. See 
POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 385 (quoting from a US official’s journal); 
Jeffrey Gettleman, In Africa, Benjamin Netanyahu Looks for Friends, and U.N. Votes, for Israel, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/africa/israel-africa-
netanyahu-uganda-kenya-rwanda.html?emc=eta1 [https://perma.cc/A9AV-LSBP] (archived 
Oct. 26, 2017). 
79. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Longman, The 
Undemocratic Nature of Transition in Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 27 
(arguing that the genocide perpetrators were worried about the moderating influence of civil 
society and so targeted Hutus and Tutsis associated with those organizations). 
80 . See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 115 (arguing 
neighbors killed neighbors, doctors killed patients, and schoolteachers killed pupils); KINZER, 
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when the RPF army – led by Paul Kagame – defeated the Hutu regime 
and its army and either killed, captured or drove into exile the 
genocidaires.81 
Later sections of this paper will discuss the fact that the 
international community gives Paul Kagame wide latitude, continuing 
to support his government in spite of strong evidence of its human 
rights abuses.82 Its blind support is rooted in its well-founded shame at 
abetting the genocide. 
Above all, the French were despicable. Fearing a general loss of 
influence in Africa 83  and more specifically the spread of Anglo-
American influence on the continent84 (Kagame and most members of 
the RPF had grown up in exile in Uganda and spoke English rather than 
French), 85  France armed, 86  funded and trained the genocidaires. 87 
Worse yet, it continued to protect and support the Hutu rump regime 
																																																																																																																												
supra note 3, at 164 (arguing soldiers and militiamen “cut” people they had known for years 
including neighbors and coworkers); POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 334 
(arguing that once the killing spread beyond Kigali it was carried out with knives, machetes, and 
clubs). 
81. Timeline: 100 days of genocide, BBC NEWS, (last updated Apr. 6, 2004, 8:42 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm [https://perma.cc/A3DN-2VRW] (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2017). 
82. See generally infra notes 127-143 and accompanying text. 
83. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing France 
viewed francophone Africa as “a virtual extension of the motherland”); KINZER, supra note 3, 
at 94-96 (similar); KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 56 (arguing that France believed its influence in 
francophone Africa helped ensure its position on the world stage). 
84. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90; KINZER, supra note 
3, at 130; Linda Melvern, France and Genocide: The Murky Truth, THE TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 
8, 2008, at 25 (arguing that “[o]nce Rwanda was ‘lost’ to Anglophone influence, [French leaders 
believed] French credibility in Africa would never recover.”). 
85. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing “the fact that 
the RPF had emerged out of Anglophone Uganda inspired the ancient French tribal phobia of 
the Anglo-Saxon menace”). 
86.  See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 140-42; see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM 
YOU, supra note 15, at 104 (arguing France continued to deliver arms to the Hutu government 
in Kigali even after the Arusha Accords had declared Kigali a weapons-free zone); KINZER, 
supra note 3, at 94 (arguing France during the early 1990s sold the Rwandan government more 
than $20 million in arms and helped it buy five times that amount, including helicopters, tanks, 
and missiles, from dealers in Egypt and South Africa). 
87. See KROSLAK, supra note 48, at 99, 146-47 (arguing that the French government 
“stood full square behind the Habyarimana regime” by equipping and training the Hutu army, 
police, Presidential Guard and militias); see also BARNETT, supra note 67, at 88 (arguing France 
was closely tied to the Hutu hardliners and supported them with training and equipment); 
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 155 (referring to France’s “blatant 
complicity in the preparation and implementation of the butchery”). 
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long after it was apparent that it was perpetrating genocide. 88 
Ultimately, many of the genocidaires who made it to the safety of 
French lines were escorted over the border into Zaire (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), some in ranks and carrying their 
weapons,89 where they wreaked havoc on Rwanda and the rest of the 
region for years to come.90 
The French were not the only perfidious actors from the 
international community. Americans were almost as bad. The United 
States had recently experienced a military debacle in Mogadishu, 
Somalia, and President Clinton and his administration wanted nothing 
to do with chaotic African conflicts.91 Thus, not only did the US decline 
to use its military might to stop the slaughter, 92  it aggressively 
employed its political and economic power to prevent the United 
Nations and other international bodies from taking decisive action.93 
																																																																																																																												
88. See KINZER, supra note 3, at 165, 174 (arguing that three months into the genocide 
French President Mitterrand was still supplying weapons and field support to the Hutu army and 
was determined to prevent an RPF victory); see also GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, 
supra note 15, at 89 (arguing the French continued huge arms shipments to Rwanda right through 
the killings in 1994). 
89. See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 161; KINZER, supra 
note 3, at 184; Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 82. 
90. See Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 150; see also KINZER supra note 3, at 188 
(describing the ex-FAR’s rearming in Zaire and laying plans retake Rwanda); Newbury, 
Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 83 (arguing that by permitting the FAR to escape to 
Zaire, the French “set the stage for further violence in the region”); Filip Reyntjens, Waging 
(Civil) War Abroad: Rwanda and the DRC, in REMAKING RWANDA supra note 7, at 133 
(arguing the FAR who made it over the border into DRC planned to invade Rwanda and finish 
the genocide); Philip Gourevitch, The Life After: Fifteen Years After the Genocide the 
Reconciliation Defies Expectations, NEW YORKER (May 4, 2009), at ¶ 45 [hereinafter 
Gourevitch, The Life After] (describing the post-genocide “war of infiltration” the ex-FAR 
fought against Rwanda from its base in eastern Zaire). 
91. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 357 (arguing that policy 
makers in the Clinton administration drew an analogy to Somalia, not the Holocaust); Newbury 
& Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 312; Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 
67, at 8. 
92. Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 8 (arguing that the US even refused 
to use its AWACS planes to jam the hate-spewing radio broadcasts on the ridiculous grounds 
that it would be too expensive and might violate international law). 
93. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 346, 359 (arguing the Clinton 
administration blocked the U.N. Security Council from using the term “genocide” and 
obfuscated the fact of genocide by promoting the notion that the conflict was caused by “ancient 
tribal hatreds”). France also did its part to discourage United Nations action, partly by advising 
the famously Francophile U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, to portray the conflict 
as typical African chaos. See BARNETT, supra note 67, at 121; KINZER, supra note 3, at 118 
(arguing Ghali was Francophile and easily influenced by French diplomats). 
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The Clinton administration’s embarrassing and intellectually 
dishonest94 reluctance to get involved was highlighted in an infamous 
news conference in which a State Department spokesperson, under 
orders not to admit that genocide was taking place in Rwanda95 (which 
might have obligated the United States to take action), declared 
absurdly that there was no proof of genocide but that “acts of genocide 
may have occurred.”96 
When the genocide and the war finally ended, the RPF, with Paul 
Kagame at its head, took possession of a country in blood-soaked 
ruins. 97  Rwanda’s economy, infrastructure, and institutions were 
devastated.98 The judiciary, for example, could not function because its 
personnel were dead or in exile and because its facilities had been 
stripped right down to the light bulbs.99 
The RPF got to work and over the following decades made 
extraordinary advances in rebuilding Rwanda.100  Many of the new 
government’s policies have been controversial, including the use of 
neo-traditional gacaca courts to try genocide perpetrators and clear the 
enormous backlog of accused, and the forced resettlement of peasant 
farmers in accordance with the country’s imidugudu (“villagization”) 
																																																																																																																												
94. See POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL, supra note 57, at 354 (arguing by the second 
day of the killing the US possessed sufficient intelligence to clearly demonstrate a genocide was 
taking place). 
95 . See GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 153 (arguing 
“Washington didn’t want to act. So Washington pretended that it wasn’t a genocide”); KINZER, 
supra note 3, at 170 (arguing President Clinton’s administration was under orders not to use the 
word “genocide” because it would create a moral, if not legal, responsibility to intervene); 
Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 14 (arguing the administration avoided using 
the “g-word” because it would harm its credibility if admitted a genocide was taking place but 
did nothing);. 
96. KINZER, supra note 3, at 171; Power, Bystanders to Genocide, supra note 67, at 15 
(arguing that the spokesperson’s responses were a “semantic dance”). 
97. Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing post-genocide Rwanda was 
“blood-sodden and pillaged”). 
98 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 177 (arguing that after the genocide Rwanda was 
“shattered morally, politically, socially, and economically”); Gourevitch, The Life After, supra 
note 90, at 37 (arguing the country’s infrastructure was trashed, its economy gutted and its court 
system vitiated). 
99.  GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 229; Allen & Norris, 
supra note 7, at 155. 
100 . See KINZER, supra note 3, at 1-2, 230 (describing Rwanda’s remarkable post-
genocide recovery); see also Ansoms, Reconstruction, supra note 13, at 241 (arguing Rwanda’s 
post-genocide economic recovery has been “exceptional”); Gourevitch, The Life After, supra 
note 90, at 37 (arguing per-capital gross domestic product nearly tripled in the fifteen years after 
the genocide). 
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policy, purportedly aimed at stimulating more efficient agricultural 
production.101 But the country’s overall economic and social progress 
has been exemplary 102  when measured by widely accepted 
development indicators such as those that make up the UN 
Development Index.103 Among many other improvements, Rwanda has 
vastly increased child and adult literacy, made education more widely 
available to girls and women, reduced infant and maternal mortality, 
improved access to health care and health insurance, made it easier to 
establish new businesses, significantly improved transportation and 
communication infrastructures, and expanded the economy at an 
impressive average of 9% per year over the past two decades.104 At the 
same time, Rwanda has made impressive strides in battling 
corruption.105 
Not all of Rwanda’s development-related news is positive. Critics 
argue that much of the country’s economic growth has redounded to 
the benefit of an elite, urban, Anglophone, Tutsi community and that 
the government has made comparatively little progress fighting rural 
poverty. 106  Others accuse Rwanda of gaming the development 
																																																																																																																												
101. See generally infra notes 329-44 and accompanying text; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 2001: RWANDA (2001). 
102. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 12 (listing the Kagame regime’s many 
achievements); Jansen, supra note 7, at 191 (arguing Rwanda’s previous ten years of GDP 
growth averaged 7.4%, nearly double the regional average). 
103  See World Bank, Main Report, (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org
/curated/en/2014/06/19712279/rwanda-country-partnership-strategy-period-fy2014-18-vol-2-
3-accelerating-economic-growth [https://perma.cc/4VJY-5FMD] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); 
see also Jansen, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing Rwanda was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa 
on pace to meet its Millennium Challenge Goals by 2015). 
104. See Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing there have been vast 
improvements in access to health insurance, education, and more); United Nations Development 
Programme, Rwanda Final MDG Progress Report: 2013 (Dec. 2014), http://www.rw.undp.
org/content/rwanda/en/home/library/mdg/-millenium-development-goals-rwanda-2015-.html 
[https://perma.cc/7GPN-DQ7C ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). But see Ansoms, Reconstruction, 
supra note 13, at 241- 42 (arguing that Rwanda’s economic growth has not been accompanied 
by significant poverty reduction, and that much of the economic growth has benefitted only 
elites). 
105. Marie Chêne, Help-Desk Answer: Anti-Corruption Progress in Georgia, Liberia, 
Rwanda, World Bank Grp., (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/06/
19712279/rwanda-country-partnership-strategy-period-fy2014-18-vol-2-3-accelerating-
economic-growth [https://perma.cc/6SHN-NXST] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
106. See An Ansoms, Re-Engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the 
Rwandan Elite, 108 AFR. AFF. 289, 292 (2009) [hereinafter Ansoms, Re-Engineering Rural 
Society] (arguing Rwandan elite seek to artificially upgrade rural life, “while hiding the extent 
of poverty and inequality”); An Ansoms, Resurrection After Civil War and Genocide: Growth, 
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numbers: reverse engineering how NGOs measure development 
progress and implementing programs to boost their numbers, not 
address real problems.107 Some even question Rwanda’s vaunted fight 
against corruption, pointing out that the regime sometimes uses 
corruption charges to punish political dissenters.108  Still, Rwanda’s 
progress since the genocide has been impressive. 
All of this progress took place under Paul Kagame’s leadership. 
Although he initially assumed the role of vice president in Rwanda’s 
post-genocide government, ceding the presidency to a Hutu named 
Pasteur Bizimungu, no one ever doubted that Kagame was in charge.109 
When Bizimungu broke with Kagame over what he perceived to be 
excessive suppression of political expression in the country, Kagame’s 
loyalists attacked him on grounds of corruption, leading to his 
resignation in 2000.110 
Kagame ascended to the presidency, and, after winning two 
highly questionable elections along the way,111 has been in that office 
ever since. Although Rwanda’s constitution until recently limited the 
president to two consecutive seven-year terms, which would have 
meant the end of Kagame’s presidency in 2017, in 2015 he and his 
																																																																																																																												
Poverty and Inequality in Post-Conflict Rwanda, 17 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 495, 500 (2005) (arguing 
there has been an “enormous shift of income from poor to rich”). 
107. See Filip Reyntjens, Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics: Poverty Reduction Rwandan-
Style and How the Aid Community Loves It, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://africanarguments.org/2015/11/03/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics-poverty-reduction-
rwandan-style-and-how-the-aid-community-loves-it/ [https://perma.cc/GWH2-RNW8] 
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing Rwanda manipulates statistics to exaggerate its progress in 
alleviating poverty and thereby blunt criticism about its poor human rights record); see also 
Nicolas Germain, Rwanda Accused of Manipulating Poverty Statistics, FRANCE 24 (Nov. 2, 
2015), http://www.france24.com/en/20151102-rwanda-accused-manipulating-poverty-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/WKR9-REJD] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (similar). 
108. See generally infra notes 110, 243 and accompanying text. 
109. See Longman, supra note 79, at 32 (arguing that when Paul Kagame occupied the 
offices of vice president and minister of defense, he “maintained real control” of the 
government). 
110. Chris McGreal, Tutsi Soldier to Lead Rwanda, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2000), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/25/chrismcgreal [https://perma.cc/JU5L-4FY6] 
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (“Gen Kagame’s allies were quick to hit back at Mr Bizimungu by 
saying he had resigned because he too faced a corruption investigation.”). 
111 . See Rachel Haymen, Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda, in 
REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing that the RPF fraudulently fixes the results 
of Rwandan elections); see generally Longman, supra note 79, at 26-27 (arguing Rwanda has 
made the post-genocide transition under Kagame from one type of authoritarian regime to 
another). 
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regime carefully stage-managed a public outcry demanding that he 
extend his leadership. 112  On cue, Rwanda’s people voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of a referendum to extend the president’s 
term. 113  Rwanda’s legislature in turn approved the constitutional 
amendment. 114  The change virtually guarantees that Kagame will 
remain president far into the future. 
Today, Paul Kagame is among the world’s most polarizing 
political figures.115 Some commentators celebrate him as a visionary 
leader who is brilliant, disciplined, acetic, incorruptible, and who 
demands efficiency and performance by everyone who works for 
him.116 He pals around with Fortune 500 CEOs, is supported by high-
profile private foundations,117 and is a frequent and much sought-after 
participant in international think-fests such as the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland.118 
																																																																																																																												
112. See Briefing, supra note 4; see also Phil Clark, Rwanda: Kagame Third Term - 
Popular Support but a Wary Ruling Party, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-phil-clark/rwanda-kagame-third-term-_b_8703166.html 
[https://perma.cc/RQ3A-CHS9] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the petition was 
“government-orchestrated” and that rural Rwandans reported being cajoled by local authorities 
to sign the pro-Kagame petition multiple times); Claudine Vidal, How Paul Kagame Made 
Himself Rwanda’s President for Life, RAND DAILY MAIL (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/01/19/how-paul-kagame-made-himself-rwanda-s-
president-for-life [https://perma.cc/GUT2-UC4L] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the 
government’s “orderly and sophisticated” campaign to extend Kagame’s presidency 
“culminated with the production of a ‘spontaneous’ mass petition,” as the “final step of a 
meticulously prepared political process…”). 
113 . RWANDA: Successful Referendum, 52 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL. SOC. CULTURAL 
SERIES 20815B–20816B (2016) [hereinafter Successful Referendum]. 
114. Id. 
115. See generally Jeffrey Gettleman, The Global Elite’s Favorite Strongman, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html?
mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/QT79-8YGB] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). 
116.  See CRISAFULLI & REDMOND, supra note 3, at 92 (arguing Paul Kagame has the 
attributes of a successful corporate CEO, that he runs Rwanda like a business, and that the 
country’s success is due to his leadership); see also KINZER, supra note 3, at 337 (arguing that 
Kagame is the “man of the hour in modern Africa”); Gourevitch, Letter from the Congo, supra 
note 3, at 42 (praising Kagame as a new type of African leader). 
117. See generally Eugenia Zorbas, Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining 
the Rwandan Paradox, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 108 (arguing that donors view 
Kagame as a trustworthy partner and the RPF as indispensable to Rwandan development). 
118. Gourevitch, The Life After, supra note 90, at 47; Anjan Sundaram, Rwanda: The 
Darling Tyrant, POLITICO (March/Apr. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014
/02/rwanda-paul-kagame-americas-darling-tyrant-103963 [https://perma.cc/RS3Y-7DRX] 
(archived Nov. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Sundaram, Darling Tyrant] (arguing Kagame is a dictator 
but “has a great many friends” including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Bill Gates). 
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And yet, others claim he is among the most prominent unindicted 
war criminals in the world.119 Not only has he waged unimaginably 
bloody 120  proxy wars 121  in neighboring Congo, 122  and allegedly 
subsidized Rwanda’s economic miracle by illicitly extracting vast 
mineral wealth from that country,123 he has also engaged in violent 
suppression of political dissent inside and outside of Rwanda.124 As 
described in more detail in later parts of this paper, the list of jailed, 
disappeared, and assassinated political opponents and independent 
journalists is long and growing. His harshest critics claim that Rwanda 
is being run for the economic benefit of a small, elite group of 
Anglophone, diaspora Tutsis125 and that anyone who objects, including 
Tutsi genocide survivors, risks immediate, brutal punishment or 
worse.126 
																																																																																																																												
119. See French, supra note 4 (quoting the Rwanda scholar Filip Reyntjens as claiming 
President Kagame is “probably the worst war criminal in office today”). 
120. See Stearns & Borello, Bad Karma, supra note 21, at 154-55, 162 (arguing that the 
RPA and its allies massacred hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees in Eastern Congo and 
arguably committed genocide); see also Reyntjens, supra note 90, at 135 (referring to a U.N. 
investigation concluding that the Rwandan Patriotic Army committed large-scale war crimes 
and crimes against humanity in Zaire/Congo). 
121. See Reyntjens, supra note 90, at 141 (referring to the Congo conflicts as Rwandan 
proxy wars); and at 133 (arguing that Rwanda’s invasions of Congo evinced a “profound 
disrespect for human life”). 
122. See id. at 132 (arguing Rwanda has twice invaded Congo – in 1996 and 1998 – and 
that the second invasion was largely about “exploitation of natural resources”); see also French, 
supra note 4; Zorbas, supra note 117, at 112 (arguing that while donors looked the other way at 
domestic political suppression, they began in 2004 to withhold support due to Rwanda’s military 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
123. See French, supra note 4 (arguing that the proceeds from pillaging the Congo have 
gone to the military and a small cadre of elite, urban Anglophone Tutsi returnees); Reyntjens, 
supra note 90, at 139-40 (arguing that Rwanda has pillaged vast mineral wealth from the areas 
it controlled in eastern Congo – including US$80 to $100 million in coltan alone, roughly the 
equivalent of Rwanda’s annual defense budget – and that the regime used the money to buy 
“needed domestic elite loyalty). 
124 . See generally infra Part IV (describing systematic oppression in contemporary 
Rwanda); Jansen, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that Rwanda scores badly in measures of freedom 
of expression and democracy). 
125. See JEAN HATZFELD, THE ANTELOPE’S STRATEGY: LIVING IN RWANDA AFTER THE 
GENOCIDE 90 (Linda Coverdale trans., Farrar et al. eds., 2009); French, supra note 4; Longman, 
supra note 79, at 42. 
126 . See Siobhan O’Grady, Former Rwandan Official Worries That Kagame’s 
Administration is Backsliding Into Mass Murder, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/29/former-rwandan-official-worries-that-kagames-
adminis%C2%ADtration-is-back%C2%ADsliding-into-mass-murder/ [https://perma.cc/LTC7-
HQSS] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that a silence is settling over Rwanda as the Kagame 
regime assassinates ever more political opponents and critics); see also Daniel Donova, 
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III. MEMORY, HISTORY, AND POWER IN RWANDA 
A. Helpful Constructs from Memory Studies and Historiography 
Until recently, memory was thought of as an individual 
phenomenon and was considered the exclusive realm of psychologists, 
psychoanalysts, and philosophers.127 But in the 1980s, memory studies, 
an interdisciplinary field that sprang from the social sciences,128 began 
viewing society itself as a remembering entity.129 Individuals within 
societies formulate their own memories and their own versions of 
history,130 but societies also form “collective” or “national” memories 
through which nationally conscious individuals formulate a national 
identity.131 
Collective (or national) memory can, but does not necessarily, 
grow organically from the recollections and discourses of a society’s 
individuals. 132  Sometimes, entrenched elites within a given society 
exercise their power to craft a particular collective memory: they 
“instrumentalize” the past and enforce a version of memory and history 
																																																																																																																												
Kagame’s Iron Fist Stokes Fires in Rwanda, US NEWS (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/01/10/kagames-iron-fist-could-
rekindle-rwandan-civil-war [https://perma.cc/Z2P6-23XB] (Archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing 
Kagame’s regime operates in a manner “much closer to a criminal organization than a state,” 
that anyone who contradicts the government is punished, and the press is run by the 
government); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: REPRESSION ACROSS BORDERS: 
ATTACKS AND THREATS AGAINST RWANDAN OPPONENTS AND CRITICS ABROAD (Jan. 28, 
2014) https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders [https://perma
.cc/JW4R-WJ46] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that political opponents in Uganda, Kenya, 
South Africa, and various countries in Europe have been threatened or attacked and that exiled 
Rwandans believe “no one is out of reach” of the Kagame regime). 
127. OLIVIER NYIRUBUGARA, COMPLEXITIES AND DANGERS OF REMEMBERING AND 
FORGETTING IN RWANDA 15 (2013). 
128. See Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From Collective 
Memory to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 105, 108 (1998); 
see also Jan-Werner Muller, Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power, and 
the Power Over Memory, in MEMORY AND POWER IN POST-WAR EUROPE: STUDIES IN THE 
PRESENCE OF THE PAST 13 (Jan-Werner Muller ed., 2004) (arguing “[t]here has been an 
explosion of literature on memory in recent years”); Henry L. Roediger, III & James V. Wertsch, 
Creating a New Discipline of Memory Studies, in MEMORY STUD. 9-22 (2008) (discussing the 
rise of memory studies as a discipline). 
129. NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 15. 
130. Muller, supra note 128, at 3. 
131. Id. at 3. 
132. See René Lemarchand, Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda, in 
L’AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS: ANNUAIRE 2006-2007 21, 28 (2007) (contrasting “historical 
memory” from “collective memory”). 
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that justifies their political domination.133 In places like these, history 
and historiography become nationalist enterprises.134 History teachers 
become tools of what in essence is state propaganda.135 
Controlling collective memory becomes particularly important to 
those who have prevailed in a civil war or other violent social 
conflicts.136 Rwanda is a case in point. Shortly after taking power, the 
RPF “embarked on a campaign to re-educate Rwandans (and outsiders) 
about Rwanda’s past,” particularly the role that ethnicity played in the 
country’s distant past and in the 1994 genocide.137 Not surprisingly, the 
new version both supports the Kagame government’s claim to 
legitimacy and absolves it of any responsibility for past wrongs.138 
Kagame, a former intelligence operative and thus a man who 
presumably understands how to mold a collective consciousness, has 
become a master of “memory entrepreneurship,” deft at manipulating 
the past for present political purposes.139 
This political manipulation is abhorrent to historians, including 
the esteemed American scholar David Newbury, who describe it as the 
																																																																																																																												
133. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 49; René Lemarchand, The Politics of 
Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in AFTER GENOCIDE, supra note 27, at 64, 70-71 
(referring to this phenomenon as “manipulated memory”); Olick & Robbins, supra note 128, at 
110, 126; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 75, at 53 (arguing “fabricating continuity 
with the past in order to socially engineer the future is a common strategy of political elites”); 
Berthold Molden, Resistant Pasts Versus Mnemonic Hegemony: On the Power Relations of 
Collective Memory, in MEMORY STUD., supra note 128, at 125-35 (arguing that dominant 
groups within societies use their hegemonic power to impose historical interpretations that 
support their interests and compel the dominated groups to accept that the interests of the 
dominant are the natural state of the world); Moritz Schuberth, The Politics of Knowledge 
Production in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 35 STRATEGIC REV. FOR S. AFR. 78, 80 (2013) 
(arguing that fights over memory are often attempts to convince the public of a specific “truth” 
that supports a specific political and economic agenda). 
134. See Olick & Robbins, supra note 127, at 126; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING, 
supra note 75, at 53 (arguing it is a common strategy of political elites to “fabricate continuity 
with the past to socially engineer a future” to its liking). 
135. See Nancy Honicker, ‘Douce France’ . . . Growing Rough Around the Edges?, 29 
KENYON REV. 81, 84 (2007). 
136. Muller, supra note 128, at 3. 
137. Lyndsay McLean Hilker, Young Rwandans’ Narratives of the Past (and Present), in 
REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 316. 
138. Id. at 318; Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 61. 
139. See Olick & Robbins, supra note 128, at 128; see also THOMSON, WHISPERING, 
supra note 76, at 53 (arguing the Kagame regime’s version of history is “strategically 
revisionist”); Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 67 (arguing much of 
contemporary Rwandan history “does not seem to have resulted from analysis but from apparent 
political objectives”). 
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use of “deductive methods in which selective data are mobilized to 
support predetermined conclusions.”140 History in Rwanda, he argues, 
“is being expostulated without reference even to the most elemental 
historical resources, or reference to alternative assessments . . . .”141 
Certain elements of Rwanda’s new, official history are factual, but 
those facts often are cherry picked: bits of history are taken out of 
context and without nuance, then reassembled in ways that support the 
regime’s claim to power.142 Writing together, David and Catherine 
Newbury drolly refer to this brand of history as “truncated 
empiricism.”143 
The following sections describe the Kagame regime’s self-serving 
version of Rwanda’s history and show how it departs from the views 
of independent historians. 
B. The History of Rwanda According to the Kagame Regime 
1.  Ethnicity and Political Power 
According to the Kagame regime’s official version of history, 
Rwanda was a peaceful, harmonious, unified state before the arrival of 
European colonialists. 144  A Tutsi monarchy ruled, 145  mostly 
benevolently, 146  relying on a network of regional chiefs and sub-
																																																																																																																												
140. Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 61. 
141. Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 67, 72 (arguing that Rwanda 
should “make the study of history more historical”). 
142. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65-67 (arguing the Rwandan government selects 
various shards of history to construct a “convenient reality” that supports its legitimacy). 
143. Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 849. 
144.  NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; Sarah Warshauer Freedman, et. al., Teaching 
History in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 297, 301; Susan 
Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation: Participant Observations on Ingando, in REMAKING 
RWANDA, supra note 7, at 332-33 [hereinafter Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation] 
(arguing the RPF claims in pre-colonial Rwanda all people lived “in peaceful harmony and 
work[ed] together for the good of the nation”) (quoting The National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission, The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies (2004)). 
145. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing that the Kagame regime’s 
official history begins with an already established Tutsi monarchy, glossing over the more 
nuanced, complicated history of interaction among various groups). 
146. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 42 (arguing the RPF teaches young people 
that in pre-colonial Rwanda people were kind to one another and “the rich were keen to help the 
poor”); THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50 (arguing the regime claims conflict 
between groups was rare in pre-colonial Rwanda). 
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chiefs.147 The origins of this happy kingdom are vague, but they stretch 
back into the mists of time.148 
Importantly, the terms “Tutsi” and “Hutu” had different meanings 
in those happier days. They existed as concepts, but they described 
socio-economic classes, not distinct “tribes” or “ethnicities.”149 Wealth 
was measured largely in cattle, and the minority Tutsi tended to be 
comparatively wealthy pastoralists, while the majority Hutu tended to 
be less well-off agriculturalists.150 But there was fluidity between the 
socio-economic groups: if a Hutu man accumulated cattle and became 
wealthier, he and his family would ascend to the category Tutsi.151 
Likewise, a Tutsi who lost his cattle and his wealth might descend to 
the category of Hutu.152 (The Twa, forest dwellers whom historians 
consider to be the area’s indigenous people, are for the most part left 
out of the official narrative.)153 In sum, before colonial interference, the 
people of Rwanda were unified. They spoke the same language, 
worshiped the same gods, were economically interdependent, and were 
loyal to the same benevolent leader.154 Conflict was rare, and when it 
happened it was rooted in regional or clan identities, not ethnicity.155 
2. Causes of the Genocide 
The idea that Hutu and Tutsi people were separate “tribes” or 
“ethnicities” was a pernicious invention devised by German and 
																																																																																																																												
147. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 58. 
148. See id. at 56 (arguing the Kagame regime sometimes invokes the ancient origins of 
the Nyiginya dynasty when in fact that history is better understood as lineages and clans 
interacting and vying for power); Newbury, Understanding, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing that 
the royal dynasty became dominant only in the last two hundred years and that to claim Rwanda 
as a “single political unit that goes far back in time” runs contrary to the historical record). 
149. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50; see Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic 
Mass, supra note 31, at 313 (criticizing the RPF’s claims that ethnic identities in Rwanda are 
“simply products of external machinations”). 
150. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50 (arguing Rwanda’s official history 
maintains Tutsi and Hutu were based partly on occupations). 
151. See id. (arguing the Kagame regime insists that the labels “Tutsi” and “Hutu” were 
based on poverty and wealth, not blood, and that wealth could cause one to shift from Twa or 
Hutu to Tutsi). 
152. Id. 
153. See id. at 17, 81 (arguing that an estimated 10,000 Twa were murdered during the 
genocide but never included in the RPF’s official history). 
154. Id. at 50. 
155. Id. 
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especially Belgian colonialists 156  to facilitate their domination and 
exploitation of Rwanda’s territory and people. 157  The Belgians, in 
collusion with the White Fathers from the Catholic Church, taught 
Rwandans that Hutu and Tutsi were separate, competing tribes, and that 
they should hate one another.158 Beginning in the 1930s, they reified 
this tribal distinction by issuing national identity cards that declared 
individuals’ race and made it permanent.159 They also perpetuated the 
false notion that Hutu and Tutsi people were the products of separate 
migrations, with the Tutsi people infiltrating from the region of the Nile 
in comparatively recent times.160 During and after the Hutu Revolution 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they indoctrinated a political Hutu 
elite in their false, divisive history, encouraging them to hate and fear 
the Tutsi.161 
This hateful, false, foreign history caused violent political 
competition between Hutus and Tutsis. It was used by Rwanda’s post-
independence Hutu leaders to divide the country, suppress Tutsis, and 
maintain their illegitimate rule. 162  Ultimately, it created a mindset 
among Hutus that led inexorably to the 1994 genocide.163 Colonialists 
had taught the Hutu to atavistically hate the Tutsi, making inevitable 
the political violence that lasted from the 1950s through the early 
1990s, and culminating in the events of 1994.164 
3. Historical Narratives About the Genocide Itself 
Once the genocide began, it was up the RPF and the RPF alone to 
stop it.165 They militarily defeated the genocidal Hutu regime, racing 
																																																																																																																												
156. Id. 
157. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, 
at 64-65; Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 336. 
158. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, 
at 50; Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 336. 
159. GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU, supra note 15, at 56-57. 
160. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50, 55. 
161. See NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 33 (arguing the post-colonial Hutu presidents, 
Kayibanda and Habyarimana, continued to use ethnicity as a wedge to divide Rwanda and 
maintain power). 
162.  See id. at 33; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 50-51; 
163. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 51. 
164. Id. 
165. See Victor Peskin, Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and 
the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR , in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 174 (arguing 
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through the country (sometimes being compelled to face off with the 
French)166 to take possession of territory and stop the slaughter.167 
Although there may have been a few random revenge killings along the 
way carried out by distraught RPF soldiers, Kagame and his troops 
were scrupulous in abiding by the rules of warfare and avoiding civilian 
casualties. 168  The RPF’s restraint and discipline was all the more 
impressive given that all Hutus, not just representatives of the 
government and military, were guilty of genocide.169 Concomitantly, 
all victims and survivors were Tutsi.170 
Not surprisingly, this version of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
independence history of Rwanda supports the Kagame regime’s claim 
to legitimacy as well as its need to intervene aggressively to reeducate 
the populace. If ethnicity is a mere colonial invention, as the 
government claims, it should be ignored and abolished.171 The fact that 
contemporary Rwanda is ruled almost entirely by an Anglophone Tutsi 
elite is of no particular consequence,172 because the label “Tutsi” lacks 
historical and political salience.173 The government’s arguably heavy-
handed efforts to impose a Rwandan nationalism on its people174 are in 
fact a return to a golden age before Europeans despoiled the country.175 
The government’s historical narrative of the genocide similarly 
bolsters its claim to legitimate rule.176 Kagame and his RPF troops had 
																																																																																																																												
Rwanda’s government has claimed the status of “rescuer” of Tutsi victims of the genocide and 
likens calls for RPF prosecutions as genocide denial). 
166. See generally supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
167. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 84 (arguing the Rwandan government 
invokes the RPF’s “heroic status” to justify its repressive rule). 
168. See Peskin, supra note 165, at 175 (arguing the Rwandan government claims RPF 
troops acted correctly with the exception of a few aggrieved individuals); see also Haskell & 
Waldorf, supra note 74, at 53, 54-58 (arguing the government claims RPF crimes were isolated 
revenge killings by a small number of rogue soldiers and blocks all attempts to investigate 
further). 
169 . Helen Hintjens, Reconstructing Political Identities in Rwanda, in AFTER 
GENOCIDE, supra note 27, at 77, 87; Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 
315. 
170 .  See Nigel Eltringham, The Past is Elsewhere: The Paradoxes of Proscribing 
Ethnicity in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 269, 270; see also 
THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 17 (arguing the government considers all Hutu to be 
violent killers who need to be reeducated on what it means to be Rwandan). 
171. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 294. 
172. See generally supra note 123. 
173. See generally supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text. 
174. See generally infra Part IV. 
175. Eltringham, supra note 170, at 270. 
176. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 293. 
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nothing to do with spurring the genocide, and once the killing began, 
he and his collaborators sprang into action and saved not just his 
people, but also his nation. This gives him and the RPF unquestioned 
moral authority to lead the country out of violence and madness and 
into a peaceful and prosperous future. Further, the fact that Rwanda’s 
entire Hutu population was indoctrinated into the colonialists’ evil, 
divisive, anti-nationalist worldview means that Kagame and his regime 
are justified in taking extreme measures and exercising tight control as 
they guide the population back toward the true path. 
C. The History of Rwanda According to Historians 
As the following discussion reveals, there is overlap between the 
Rwandan government’s self-serving version of history and the version 
that historians generally agree upon. However, the historians’ account 
includes context and nuance and that does not necessarily support the 
Kagame regime’s claim to political legitimacy. 
1. Ethnicity and Political Power 
It is true, as claimed by Rwanda’s government, that the terms 
Hutu and Tutsi held different meanings in pre-colonial Rwanda than 
they do today. It is false, however, to assert that those terms were 
unconnected to ethnic distinctions and that Europeans invented ethnic 
division in what today is Rwanda. 
In fact, the meaning and political salience of ethnic identities in 
Rwanda have varied according to the historical epoch and the specific 
geographic, political, and social context.177 In most of what now is 
Rwanda, for most of its history, region, clan and kinship were more 
important to peoples’ identity than the ethnic labels “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi.”178 Two hundred or more years ago there were as many as fifty 
different political units in the territory we now call Rwanda, some with 
leaders we today would perceive as “Hutu,” some “Tutsi.”179 They 
viewed themselves as distinct from one another, but their distinction 
sprang from their geographic location or their clan or lineage identities, 
not their ethnicity.180 
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179. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 85. 
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The economies of certain of these small kingdoms, mainly those 
located in present-day Rwanda’s eastern grasslands, were based on 
cattle herding.181 It became important for them to claim control over 
their grasslands, thus they became more stratified and militarized over 
time.182 By the mid-1700s, one such grassland group, the Nyiginya 
dynasty, began to assert broader control and to seek to centralize its 
authority.183 Only then, as the emergent kingdom was asserting control 
and coherence did the notion arise of membership in a group called 
“Tutsi.”184 As the royal Nyiginya dynasty expanded and came into 
contact with others of different cultures, it reinforced its own identity 
as “Tutsi.”185  As this Tutsi identity coalesced, others continued to 
construct their own identities through their lineages and locales.186 But 
as the Tutsi kingdom expanded its reach and thrust ever more groups 
into subservient political positions,187 those subservient groups also 
began to form a common identity; in this instance, as “Hutu.”188 
It is also true, as the Rwandan government claims, that the 
boundaries between the social and ethnic categories “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi” were historically porous and that individuals sometimes 
switched groups as a result of marriage or economic gain or loss.189 But 
the historical record does not support the regime’s claims that those 
categories were based merely on class distinction, that there was little 
or no conflict, and that Hutus and Tutsis lived in a more or less 
cooperative and symbiotic relationship where the wealthier and more 
powerful (i.e., Tutsi) looked out for the economically less powerful 
(Hutu).190 
																																																																																																																												
181. Id. at 85. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 86. 
184. See id. at 85-86; see also Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 
313 (arguing that only with the emergence of the Nyiginya clan power structures did the label 
“Tutsi” gain salience, initially only because it was used by outsiders to describe them). 
185. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 86. 
186. See Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 313 (arguing that 
political groups in what today is northwestern Rwanda did not identify as “Hutu” until quite 
recently). 
187. See Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing in this new 
and evolving context, Tutsi culture came to be associated with upper class power and Hutu 
culture with lower class labor). 
188. Id. at 86. 
189. Id. at 84. 
190. See generally supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. 
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In fact, pre-colonial Rwanda was rife with political contestation 
and conflict.191 The mutual dependence and symbiosis that the current 
government ascribes to pre-colonial Rwanda was in reality a clientship 
relationship in which mainly-Tutsi overlords exploited the labor of 
their mainly-Hutu subjects.192 These arrangements were “voluntary” 
only in that the subjects were free to choose whether to lose their lives 
or give up their labor.193 
It is also historically false that the Europeans alone were 
responsible for the stark social stratification that existed during the 
colonial era. According to David Newbury, “[i]f external power altered 
the ethnic landscape, ethnic awareness was not the work of colonialists 
alone. The ruling classes were not passive onlookers; they willingly 
participated in the extension of ethnic distinctions and in deepening the 
meaning of such distinctions.”194 In other words, colonial power altered 
ethnic conceptions and exacerbated rivalry and tension between 
ethnicities, but it simply is not true that ethnicity was a colonial 
fiction.195 
To summarize, ethnic distinctions existed before the colonialists 
arrived. The meaning of the terms Hutu and Tutsi evolved over time 
and became more significant and more reified after the Tutsi Nyiginya 
dynasty became the predominant political power in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. That kingdom developed an economic system that permitted 
elite, powerful Tutsi overlords to prosper from the labor of their mostly 
Hutu subjects. When Europeans arrived, they took these pre-existing 
ethnic categories and these pre-existing economic and social 
relationships and twisted them for their own benefit. 
																																																																																																																												
191. See Newbury, Canonical Conventions, supra note 25, at 58-59 (arguing that violence 
in Rwanda did not begin with colonial intervention); Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra 
note 14, at 84. 
192. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 860 
(arguing that so-called “cattle clientship” between wealthy and poor Rwandans was uncommon 
and did not act as “social glue”). 
193.  See id; see also NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 34-35 (arguing that if society was 
“harmonious” before the arrival of white colonialists, it was because everyone knew his or her 
place within a highly structured, hierarchical, essentially feudal social structure). 
194. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 87. 
195.  See id. at 88; see also Freedman et. al., supra note 144, at 302 (arguing ethnic 
categories already existed in pre-colonial times and were already being used to divide the 
population). 
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2. Causes of the Genocide 
According to the RPF’s approved historical narrative, atavistic 
ethnic division and hatred – introduced by the Belgians and later and 
exploited by post-independence Hutu politicians – caused the 1994 
genocide.196 According to historians, the causes of the genocide were 
varied and complex.197 
The genocide was not, as the RPF claims, the culmination of an 
ongoing ethnic pogrom that had been slowly building since the 
1950s. 198  Instead, Rwandan Hutu political leaders consciously 
manipulated ethnic division as a way to mobilize their supporters and 
maintain their positions of power and privilege. 199  The distinction 
between these narratives is important, because historians’ version 
means that there was nothing inevitable about the genocide.200 For 
generations, ethnicity had been an ongoing feature of Rwandan society 
and politics,201 “but it became politically meaningful as a result of 
leaders’ responses to crisis, not as a cause of the crisis.”202 
From the perspective of Hutu politicians in Rwanda, the 1980s 
was, indeed, a time of crisis. The country was reeling politically and 
economically and much of the population – including the Hutu 
population – was unhappy with President Habyarimana’s rule. 203 
World coffee prices had plummeted, sending the economy into a 
tailspin. 204  Externally imposed structural adjustment programs, in 
vogue after the fall of the Berlin Wall, exacerbated Rwandan’s 
economic suffering.205  The downturn led to famine in parts of the 
country,206 as well as to a surfeit of unemployed, angry young men who 
																																																																																																																												
196. See generally supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
197. See Newbury & Newbury, Bringing the Peasants Back In, supra note 10, at 875 
(arguing the genocide was caused by a combination of growing class consciousness and 
resentment of the rich, ecological factors, the role of churches and church leadership, rapid 
changes in the economy including a precipitous fall in the commodity price of coffee, a famine 
in southern Rwanda, and the abrupt withdrawal of the state from social services). 
198. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 296. 
201. See generally supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text. 
202. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295. 
203. Id. 
204. Newbury, Understanding Genocide, supra note 14, at 89. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
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were prevented from marrying by their lack of economic prospects.207 
All of the resentment and social divisions that were festering during the 
1980s – primarily divisions based on class and regional differences208 
– might have been turned against the Habyarimana regime.209 
Instead, when the RPF invaded northern Rwanda in 1990, 210 
hardliners within the Hutu government succeeded in channeling 
citizens’ frustration and anger toward what they claimed was the 
common enemy: the RPF and their supposed Tutsi collaborators within 
the country’s borders. 211  The Hutu hatemongers succeeded in 
portraying Tutsis as the common enemy and convincing much of the 
population that the RPF’s mission – in alliance with all Rwandan Tutsis 
– was to reestablish the Tutsi monarchy that had lorded over Hutus for 
generations.212 No historians – at least no credible historians – argue 
that the RPF brought the genocide upon the Tutsi people by invading 
Rwanda, but a nuanced, multi-causal explanation of events includes the 
invasion’s catalyzing effect and Hutus’ collective memory of an 
oppressive Tutsi dynasty. 
3.  Historical Narratives About the Genocide Itself 
The Kagame regime maintains that all of Rwanda’s Hutus were 
perpetrators of the genocide and that they all were motivated by ethnic 
hatred.213 Concomitantly, all genocide victims were Tutsi,214 which is 
why the Kagame regime now insists that the genocide be referred to 
exclusively as “the genocide against the Tutsi.”215 
																																																																																																																												
207. Id. at 91. 
208. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 300. 
209. See id. at 315 (arguing one result of the 1990 RPF invasion was that Hutus who were 
unhappy with the Habyarimana regime and might have joined a moderate political coalition 
were instead convinced that Tutsis were the cause of their misfortune). 
210. See generally supra Part II. 
211. See Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 8 (arguing the role the RPF’s 1990 invasion 
of Rwanda played in exacerbating ethnic division and sparking the genocide). 
212. See William F.S. Miles, The Nazi Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide, Round 
Table, 5 J. OF GENOCIDE RSCH. 131, 140 (2003) (a roundtable discussion quoting Catherine 
and David Newbury as arguing that the RPF was associated in Rwandans’ minds with the 
dynasty that had dominated Rwanda for several generations before the arrival of the Europeans); 
see also supra Part IV.C.1. 
213. See generally supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
214. See generally supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
215. See, e.g., Tashobya, infra note 260 (using the term “genocide against the Tutsi”). 
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But scholars judge several aspects of the RPF’s genocide narrative 
to be historically inaccurate. First, not all Hutus were killers. There are 
many credible accounts of Hutus opposing the genocide, sometimes by 
hiding and protecting those at risk.216 
Second, the many who did participate in the genocide had 
motivations far more complicated and varied than mere ethnic 
hatred.217 Studies have determined that killers were motivated by a 
multiplicity factors including fear of retribution for not participating, 
greed, and a cultural propensity to follow orders.218 
Third, although it is undeniably true that the vast majority of 
victims were Tutsi, many Hutu (and Twa) also died. As described in 
Part II, the first victims were politically moderate opponents of the 
Habaryamana regime, many of whom were Hutu.219 Also, many who 
died were the product of generations of intermixing and intermarrying, 
so it was not at all clear which ethnic pole they were associated with.220 
The RPF’s historical narrative also departs in significant respects 
from historians’ regarding its army’s conduct during and after the 
genocide. As recounted in the previous section, the RPF’s version 
depicts its army as blameless heroes.221 But while historians and other 
academics praise the skill and courage of the RPF army in confronting 
the genocide, 222 they also assert that the RPF’s excesses and crimes are 
an essential part of the historical narrative.223 Although Rwandans are 
not permitted to discuss or in any way acknowledge it, academics agree 
overwhelmingly that in the run-up to the RPF’s 1994 military victory, 
and in immediate aftermath, they killed an estimated 30,000 mostly-
Hutu civilians in Rwanda. 224  The Kagame regime consistently 
																																																																																																																												
216. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295. 
217. See id. (arguing people participated in the genocide for numerous reasons including 
fear, greed, and a cultural propensity to follow orders). 
218. Id.; see generally LEE ANN FUJII, KILLING NEIGHBORS: WEBS OF VIOLENCE IN 
RWANDA (2009) (arguing that genocide perpetrators’ motivations were varied and complex). 
219. Newbury & Newbury, A Catholic Mass, supra note 31, at 295. 
220. Id. 
221. See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra Part II. 
223. See Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 50 (arguing RPF crimes 
are wrongly left out of the story); THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 97 (same). 
224. Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 51. The scope of the 
unlawful killing has been verified by numerous credible sources. A team from the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees traveled through Rwanda in September of 1994 and 
concluded that the RPF had murdered, massacred or caused the disappearance of as many as 
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dismisses these incidents as random killings by emotionally 
overwhelmed, ill-disciplined foot soldiers, 225  but the renowned 
Rwanda expert, Allison Des Forges, and others, concluded that the 
widespread killings were too similar, and the army far too well 
disciplined,226 to explain them away as random acts of revenge.227 
No one, at least no one credible, claims that the killings by the 
RPF army, even though on a significant scale, were the moral 
equivalent of the genocide perpetrated by the Hutu hardliners.228 Any 
claim of a “double genocide” should be firmly rejected. 229  But in 
Rwanda, no one is permitted to discuss the RPF atrocities and, with the 
exception of a couple of minor show-trials, no one has been held to 
account.230 
4. Summarizing the Conflicting Historical Narratives 
In short, Rwanda’s current government insists on a version of pre-
colonial history characterized by a lack of ethnic difference, 
harmonious, mutually beneficial economic relationships between 
social classes, and wise political leadership provided by a beneficent 
monarch. This version of history helps legitimize the Kagame regime 
																																																																																																																												
45,000 civilians including women, children, and the elderly. Id. at 52. The renowned Rwanda 
expert, Alison Des Forges, investigated the issue for Human Rights Watch and came to a similar 
conclusion. Id. A subsequent U.N.-appointed Commission of Experts found that RPF soldiers 
had committed breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Id. at 
51. 
225. See id. at 53 (arguing that the government dismisses these incidents as mere “revenge 
killings” and charges anyone who disagrees with “genocide denial”). 
226. Peskin, supra note 164, at 174-5. 
227. Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 73, at 52; see Stearns & Borello, 
Bad Karma, supra note 20, at 164 (arguing much of the killing of Hutu civilians in the Congo 
happened after the RPF had taken control of the country and so cannot be explained as mere 
“collateral damage”). 
228. See Waldorf, Instrumentalixzing Genocide, supra note 69, at 50 (rejecting claims of 
dual genocide and moral equivalency). 
229. Id. 
There are much more serious allegations lodged against the RPF of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and even genocide, based on its military interventions in Zaire/Democratic 
Republic of Congo. See generally JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA (2011). An examination of 
those conflicts is beyond the scope of this paper. 
230. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: JUSTICE AFTER GENOCIDE – 20 YEARS ON 
(2014); see Peskin, supra note 165, at 177-179 (discussing the RPF’s successful efforts to stage 
show trials in Rwanda and prevent the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from 
investigating RPF crimes); Haskell & Waldorf, The Impunity Gap, supra note 74, at 51 (arguing 
that the ruling RPF instructed participants in Rwanda’s gacaca courts, which adjudicated 
genocide-related crimes, not to discuss any allegations against the RPF). 
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in several respects. It renders irrelevant the fact that contemporary 
Rwanda is being run by a small group of elite Tutsi because “Tutsi” 
(along with other ethnic signifiers), has no historical validity except as 
a term used by colonialists to divide Rwanda’s people. In addition, this 
version implies that it is historically appropriate – and essentially 
Rwandan – for the nation to be guided politically by a wise and 
benevolent autocrat: the king in pre-colonial days and Paul Kagame 
today. Historians and other scholars generally agree on a more 
complicated, dynamic, and nuanced version of pre-colonial history, 
one that includes ethnic difference and struggle and, crucially, 
economic exploitation by a powerful Tutsi monarchy. 
Another vital – and self-serving – aspect of the government’s 
approved historical narrative is that the 1994 genocide was caused by 
atavistic ethnic hatred that the Belgian colonialists invented and 
inculcated in Rwanda’s people. The fact that Rwandans’ minds were 
polluted with hatred, and that the inevitable result was so catastrophic, 
justifies the current regime’s efforts to reeducate its population (using 
various heavy handed methods described in Part IV, below) about the 
true nature of Rwananness. Historians, in contrast, believe that there 
were multiple, complex causes of the genocide, including the fact that 
elite Hutu politicians exploited longstanding ethnic divisions as a 
means of redirecting Hutu citizens’ anger and frustration from the 
government and toward the Tutsis who had recently invaded the 
country’s north. 
Finally, the current regime’s approved historical narrative depicts 
the RPF and Paul Kagame as blameless heroes who singlehandedly 
stopped the genocide. They halted the wanton killing by Rwanda’s 
Hutu citizens, all who were genocidaire, and they saved the remaining 
Tutsi citizens, all who were victims. Because the RPF and the RPF 
alone restored peace to Rwanda, it has the right and the moral authority 
to complete the country’s reconstruction. 
While historians agree that the RPF was responsible for halting 
the carnage, they insist that the RPF committed war crimes and crimes 
against humanity during and after its successful military campaign. 
They also emphasize that the genocide is not properly described as “the 
genocide against the Tutsi,” as the government insists it be called,231 
because although the vast majority of those killed were Tutsi, many 
Hutu and Twa were also murdered. 
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IV. ENFORCING THE KAGAME REGIME’S FANCIFUL VERSION 
OF HISTORY 
The following section describes the Rwandan government’s 
multifaceted approach to inculcating and enforcing its versions of 
history and collective memory. As the discussion will reveal, President 
Kagame and his coterie employ the usual tools of repressive regimes: 
banning unwanted speech, stifling the press, and coopting and 
controlling civil society. But the government’s efforts also include 
more sophisticated means of ensuring that only its preferred history is 
remembered: controlling academic discourse, employing “reeducation 
camps,” and exercising tight control over public memorialization. 
A. Laws Limiting Expression 
 Since taking control of Rwanda’s government, the RPF has used 
restrictions on speech, particularly speech related to the 1994 genocide, 
as a tool to squelch all unwanted expression. In recent years it has 
honed these legal tools and intensified their use. 
The first salvo was a 2001 law that proscribed acts of 
discrimination and “sectarianism” by prohibiting “the use of any 
speech, written statement or statement or action that divides people, 
that is likely to spark conflict among people, or that causes an uprising 
which might degenerate into strife among people based on 
discrimination.”232 Although the law did not explicitly say so, it was 
widely interpreted as criminalizing the use of the words “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi” except as narrowly approved by the government.233 
Rwanda’s 2003 Constitution committed the country to “fighting 
the ideology of genocide in all its manifestations”234 and criminalized 
“[r]evisionism, negationism, and trivialization of the genocide.”235 As 
many commentators pointed out, this language was sweepingly broad 
and disturbingly vague.236 
																																																																																																																												
232. Law No 47/2001 Instituting Punishment for the Offences of Discrimination and 
Sectarianism, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Dec. 18, 2001. 
233. Jansen, supra note 7, at 9. 
During my visits to Rwanda I have observed that most people are reluctant to utter the 
terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” even in private conversation. 
234. CONSTITUTION May 26, 2003, art 9 (Rwanda). 
235. Id., art. 13. 
236. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 51 see Jansen, supra note 7, 
at 11 (arguing that none of the key constitutional terms are defined). 
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The 2003 Law Punishing Genocide attempted to clarify the 
constitutional language quoted in the previous paragraph, declaring 
that the proscriptions apply to “any person who will have publicly 
shown, by his or her words, writings, images, or by any other means, 
that he or she has negated the genocide, committed, rudely minimized 
it or attempted to justify or approve its grounds . . . .” 237  Those 
convicted under the 2003 law were subject to twenty years’ 
imprisonment.238 If any Rwandan prosecutors were squeamish about 
punishing citizens based on such vaguely defined laws,239 they did not 
show it.240 According to Human Rights Watch, in a single year between 
mid-2007 and mid-2008, 243 people were charged with revisionism 
and negation, often for merely diverging from the government’s 
approved history of the genocide.241 
In more recent years, the government’s favored legal method for 
stifling unwanted expression has been to prosecute people – 
particularly Hutu people – with the even more vaporous charge of 
“genocide ideology.”242 (In contrast, Tutsi people who stray from fold 
are usually charged with corruption.)243 Charges of genocide ideology 
began emerging in 2003, even though neither the 2003 Constitution, 
nor the 2003 Law Punishing Genocide mentioned the concept.244 
In 2004, with many charges of genocide ideology already 
pending, the government ordered a Senate commission to examine 
genocide ideology’s causes and cures.245 In 2006, that commission 
issued its report and defined genocide ideology and revisionism in such 
																																																																																																																												
237. Law No. 33n bis/2003, Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes, art. 4., Official Gazette of Rwanda, Nov 1, 2003 [hereinafter 2003 Genocide 
Law.] 
238. Id., art 4. 
239. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 13 (arguing the terms of the 2003 Genocide Law – 
including “rudely minimize” – are extremely broad and pointing out that another section of the 
law also punishes “incitement” to commit such a crime, which can be applied whether or not 
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240. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 12-13 (arguing that the 2003 law was 
used to punish anyone who claimed that anyone other than Tutsi had died in the genocide and 
to anyone whom the government perceived as critical). 
241. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM 
IN RWANDA (July 2008), p. 40; Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 52. 
242. Allen & Norris, supra note 7, at 147. 
243. Id. 
244. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that Rwanda’s government began charging 
people with genocide ideology even before the law had been passed). 
245. Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 670, at 54. 
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broad terms that practically any mention of ethnicity or any criticism 
of the government falls within its ambit and may be punished.246 A 
follow-on parliamentary commission investigating genocide ideology 
uncovered evidence of the crime in twenty-six schools across the 
country, resulting in the firing of dozens of teachers.247 In 2007, the 
government began in earnest charging citizens with genocide ideology, 
even though the appropriate legislation still did not exist.248 
It was not until 2008 that the government got around to passing a 
law defining and punishing genocide ideology.249 According to that 
law, genocide ideology may be found: 
in any behavior manifested by facts aimed at dehumanizing a 
person or a group of persons with the same characteristics in the 
following manner: 1) Threatening, intimidating, degrading 
through defamatory speeches, documents, or actions which aim at 
propounding wickedness or inciting hatred; 2) Marginalizing, 
laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking, boasting, 
despising, degrading, creating confusion aimed at negating the 
genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings, taking revenge, 
altering testimony or evidence for the genocide which occurred; 3) 
Killing, planning to kill, or attempting to kill someone for the 
purposes of furthering genocide ideology.250 
As critics have pointed out, this law on genocide ideology is not 
only sweeping and vague, but is almost completely disconnected from 
the crime of genocide.251 It does not require proof that the accused 
intended to assist or facilitate genocide or possess knowledge that 
anyone else was planning genocide.252 To date, no one knows what 
these terms mean, except that virtually anyone may be prosecuted for 
saying anything the government disagrees with.253 
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Prison terms under the 2008 law range up to fifty years.254 An 
offense that involves “documents, speeches, pictures, media or any 
other means” – meaning, in effect, any genocide ideology 
communicated by any media or any politician – are punished by a 
minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment.255 Children under the age of 
twelve can be held criminally responsible, and the children’s parents 
and teachers can also be prosecuted.256 Finally, the law makes clear that 
nongovernmental organizations may be charged, and that convictions 
can lead to dissolution, fines, and individual prosecutions.257 
The government has made clear its intention to use its entire 
bureaucratic infrastructure, right down to the village level, to root out 
genocide ideology.258 Rwandan newspapers, all of which are controlled 
by the government,259 are replete with accounts of successful genocide 
ideology prosecutions and exhortations for citizens to be ever vigilant 
and report their suspicions of genocide ideology to government 
officials.260 
As was true of the 2003 Genocide Law, prosecutors have pursued 
offenders with alacrity. According to a report by Amnesty 
International, in the two years after the passage of the 2008 Genocide 
Law, hundreds of people were prosecuted for genocide ideology or 
genocide revisionism.261 Many of these prosecutions, particularly since 
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261. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAFER TO STAY SILENT, THE CHILLING EFFECT OF 
RWANDA’S LAWS ON ‘GENOCIDE IDEOLOGY’ AND ‘SECTARIANISM’ 19 (2010); Jansen, 
supra note 7, at 4 (arguing one defendant was a radio presenter who was charged with genocide 
ideology for misspeaking while reading the news). 
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the run up to the 2010 election, were targeted at the government’s 
political opponents.262 
In more recent years, the government has continued to tinker with 
its genocide laws but the revisions have shed little light on the meaning 
of the key terms and citizens continue to face prosecution for utterances 
that have nothing to do with genocide other than that they diverge from 
the regime’s preferred narrative.263 An update of the 2008 genocide law 
purportedly clarifies the crime of “negation” by adding that predicate 
acts must be public and deliberate.264 But “public acts” is defined as 
any act in “a place accessible” by two or more people, and “deliberate” 
is left undefined, which means little if anything has changed.265 
In effect, the government uses the genocide ideology laws to 
target, punish, and silence anyone who diverges from the RPF’s 
carefully constructed, self-justifying narrative. 266  This includes 
prosecution and punishment for anyone who dares refer to ethnicity in 
public,267 in keeping with the RPF’s contention that ethnic difference 
was a pernicious colonial invention.268 The laws are also consistently 
invoked to pursue anyone who in any way criticizes the regime or its 
policies.269 After all, if the Kagame regime is, as it claims, the only a 
bulwark against the resumption of genocide, then any thoughts or 
words that oppose the regime can be assumed to promote genocide. 
B. Laws and Extralegal Means for Controlling Media, Civil Society, 
and Academic Inquiry 
As revealed by the preceding discussion, the Rwandan 
government restricts unwanted expression by everyone within the 
country; however, it focuses particular attention on those who might 
authoritatively contradict its self-justifying historical narrative: the 
																																																																																																																												
262. See Jansen, supra note 7, at 19 (arguing that an opposition candidate for president, 
Agnes Uwimana-Nkusi, was prosecuted and jailed for saying that ethnic divisions led people to 
“kill each other,” which is not a government approved version of the genocide); Id. at 19 
(similar). 
263. See generally, Jansen supra note 7, at 51-57. 
264. Law No. 84/2013, Law on the Crime of Genocide Ideology and Other Related 
Offenses, Official Gazette of Rwanda, Sept. 9, 2013. 
265. Id. 
266. See Waldorf, Instrumentalizing Genocide, supra note 70, at 49-56. 
267. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65. 
268. See supra Part III.B.1. 
269. Lemarchand, supra note 132, at 65. 
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press, civil society, and scholars. Partly by invoking the vague genocide 
denial laws described in the previous section, partly by applying other 
laws that restrict who is eligible to enter the field, and partly through 
extralegal bullying and intimidation, 270  the government strictly 
enforces its version of events.271 
1. Control of Media 
Take for example Rwanda’s media. Until recently, any person or 
persons aspiring to open a media outlet had to demonstrate to the 
government, among other things, that they were in good standing in 
their home communities and that they had the financial resources in 
place to sustain the new venture.272 The government employed these 
seemingly innocuous bureaucratic strictures to control who may enter 
into public discourse through media.273 
The government also uses extralegal means to prevent the media 
from spreading ideas of which it disapproves. Anjan Sundaram’s 
recently published book, Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship, 
claims the RPF tightly controls all of Rwanda’s newspapers274 and 
places strict limits on what journalists are permitted to say. 275  To 
																																																																																																																												
270. See Chris Huggins, Shades of Grey: Post-Conflict Land Policy Reform in the Great 
Lakes Region, in THE STRUGGLE OVER LAND IN AFRICA: CONFLICTS, POLITICS & CHANGE 39 
(Ward Anseeuw & Chris Alden, eds.) (2010) (arguing The RPF has used cooptation, infiltration, 
and intimidation to control critical voices and has used legal action against the crime of 
“divisionism” to undermine the emergence of any credible opposition); see generally, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAFER TO STAY SILENT, supra note 261, at 26-29 (describing 
the government’s persistent efforts to “chill” the media and civil society). 
271. See Longman, supra note 79, at 35-37 (arguing the RPF uses vague laws and threats 
to stifle Rwanda’s press). 
272. ANJAN SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS: LAST JOURNALISTS IN A DICTATORSHIP 37 (2016) 
[hereinafter SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS]. 
273. Id. at 29. 
274. See id. at 176 (arguing that the government stifles the Rwandan press while claiming 
to have an open and vibrant media); see Freedom House, 2014 Rwanda Report, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/09/fh-free-
press_2014_rwanda.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B2M-J66F] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing the 
Rwandan government controls all aspects of the media despite reforms announced in 2013); 
Human Rights Watch, Rwanda 2014, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-
chapters/rwanda [https://perma.cc/RL4K-F75S] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that in spite 
of recent reforms Rwanda’s government forces its views on print media and intimidates and 
threatens journalists who stray from approved stories); Donova, supra note 141 (arguing the 
Rwandan press is “run by the government”). 
275. See SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 1-2 (describing an instance where 
the government prevented journalists from reporting on a grenade explosion in Kigali). 
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maintain the appearance of a vibrant press, the government cultivates 
its own cadre of fawning journalists, referred to by the Kinyarwanda 
term Intore, who happily restrict their reporting to government-
approved topics and who consistently pose softball questions to 
President Kagame and other government officials. 276  Until recent 
years, foreign-funded media programs provided some independent 
voice within Rwanda, and were sometimes willing to critique the 
regime’s excesses, but those programs have been “shut down or 
become toothless under government pressure.”277 
Under international pressure to ease restrictions on the media, the 
government took tentative steps in that direction starting in 2013.278 
Among other things, it created a purportedly independent body to vet 
and, if deemed necessary, discipline media outlets. 279  But all 
indications are that these reforms are window dressing and that the 
government continues to discipline journalists who stray from 
approved themes by, among other things, acknowledging that Hutus 
died during the genocide or alluding to ethnicity or discrimination in 
contemporary Rwanda.280 
When all else fails, the government resorts to violence to prevent 
media diffusion of information that strays from its approved narrative. 
Critics and human rights organizations have chronicled many instances 
in which journalists have been beaten, arrested, disappeared, or killed 
when they contradicted or critiqued the government. 281  As 
																																																																																																																												
276. Id. at 7-8. 
277. Sundaram, Darling Tyrant, supra note 118, at ¶ 6. 
278. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA COUNTRY SUMMARY 2016 2 (2016). 
279. Id. 
280. See generally Anton Harbor, The Committee to Protect Journalists, Legacy of Rwanda 
Genocide Includes Media Restrictions, Self-Censorship (2014), https://cpj.org/reports/2014/12/
legacy-of-rwanda-genocide-includes-media-restricti.php [https://perma.cc/FSN3-7UE7] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2017) (arguing that in spite of some recent loosening, Rwandan media laws still 
threaten imprisonment for insulting “by words, gestures, threats, writings or drawings” the 
President, any government official, the police or ordinary citizens, and that journalists still must 
constantly calculate the “unstated, vague, and arbitrary” limits on what they can say).To take 
one recent example, in 2014, Stanley Gatera, editor of a privately owned newspaper, was 
arrested on charges of corruption. The government alleged he tried to extract a bribe from a 
tavern owner by threatening to write an article about the tavern owner’s failure to observe the 
20-year anniversary of the genocide. He claimed the arrest was in retaliation for speaking to 
international news sources about limits on freedom of expression in Rwanda. Id. 
281. SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 3-4, 181-192 (providing personal 
anecdotes and an annex listing dozens of Rwandan journalists who have been beaten, 
imprisoned, killed or have fled into exile); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: 
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commentators have remarked, it does not require many beatings or 
killings before would-be independent voices within the media learn 
their lesson and begin to engage in strict self-censorship.282 
2. Control of Civil Society 
The story is similar for Rwanda’s civil society sector.283  The 
regime has suppressed, intimidated, or coopted organizations that 
might otherwise object to its official narrative.284 For example, in 2001, 
the government enacted legislation empowering itself to keep tabs on 
the management, finances, projects and outcomes of domestic and 
international NGOs that operate within the country.285 It uses these 
laws to control which civil society organizations exist and what they 
say.286 It often requires the organizations – particularly human rights 
organizations – to accept leadership that it has chosen.287 Those leaders 
then steer the organizations toward outcomes that the regime 
determines.288 It is also widely known that the government spies on and 
monitors the communication of civil society organizations, including 
international NGOs, and intervenes if it does not like what it hears.289 
																																																																																																																												
RWANDA, supra note 5 (arguing Rwanda’s government continues to intimidate and threaten 
members of the press); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: RWANDA (2011) 
(arguing the Rwandan government was responsible for killing and arresting journalists). 
Sundaram, Darling Tyrant, supra note 117 (arguing that Kagame has been responsible for 
assassinating, imprisoning, sending into exile, or torturing of more than a dozen political 
dissidents and in recent years many well-known journalists, investigators, and political 
opponents have been “found dead in mysterious circumstances”). 
282. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 113. 
283. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA COUNTRY SUMMARY, supra note 278,  at 
1-2; see id. at 13 (arguing the RFP “strictly controls civil society organizations and other forms 
of associational life, including churches and mosques”). 
284. Longman, supra note 79, at 27-28; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SAFER TO 
STAY SILENT, supra note 261, at 26-28 (describing the Rwandan government’s efforts to coopt 
and silence human rights organizations). 
285 . Paul Gready, Beyond “You’re with Us or against Us”: Civil Society and 
Policymaking in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 89. 
286. Id. at 89-90. 
287. Longman, supra note 79, at 27-28. 
288. See id. at 275 (arguing the RPF has turned the civil society sector “corporatist,” 
meaning NGOs receive and implement orders from the government); see Gready, supra note 
285, at 90 (arguing the RPF has “thoroughly infiltrated the NGO sector in Rwanda and also has 
created “umbrella organizations” to keep tabs on NGOs activities). 
289. See Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 124 (arguing there 
is a dense network of government spies throughout Rwanda); SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra 
note 172, at 159 (describing a journalist’s discovery that a friend and colleague was spying on 
him for the Rwandan government); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015: RWANDA 
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Where bureaucratic control and cooptation have been ineffective, 
the government brings violence and the threat of violence to bear.290 
As is true of journalists, it does not require many acts of violence before 
civil society leaders receive the message and begin to engage in strict 
self-censorship.291 
In its efforts to restrict the press and civil society sector, the RPF 
has not limited itself to domestic organizations. Recently, it attacked 
the BBC, and barred it from broadcasting in Rwanda in Kinyarwanda 
after a documentary film repeated allegations concerning the RPF’s 
involvement in human rights violations during and after the 
genocide.292 Similarly, it accused international NGOs such as Human 
Rights Watch and CARE International of genocide ideology when they 
questioned aspects of the regime’s preferred historical narrative.293 
																																																																																																																												
(2015) (arguing that the Rwandan government subjects NGOs to infiltration and intimidation). 
During a six-week stay in Rwanda during the summer of 2015, I had a tense and difficult 
exchange with Rwandan immigration officials. When I mentioned my experience to a European 
acquaintance who has worked for an international NGO in Rwanda for many years, he remarked 
that the government probably did not like what I was writing in my emails. When he saw my 
puzzled expression, he said he was surprised that I did not know that the government routinely 
monitors foreigners’ communications. He recounted two recent instances in which European 
NGO employees whom he knew had been spirited out of the country by their embassies after it 
became known that the Rwandan government was going to arrest them for objectionable 
communications in their private emails. He added that it was common knowledge in the NGO 
community that the Rwandan government plants spies to keep tabs on foreigners’ work. He 
casually mentioned that he and his co-workers knew that at least one Rwandan employee was 
reporting their activities to the government. 
290. See Longman, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing the regime has assassinated or caused to 
disappear numerous civil society activists). 
291. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 124. 
292. See Dugald Baird, BBC Should Face Criminal Action Over Rwanda Documentary, 
Says Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/mar
/02/bbc-rwanda-documentary-inquiry [https://perma.cc/5XYC-6E7F] (archived Nov. 6, 2017) 
(describing the government’s concerted attack – including charges of minimizing and denying 
the genocide – on the BBC for airing a documentary that questioned several tenets of Rwanda’s 
approved genocide history, including the claim that few Hutus were killed and repeating the 
claim that Kagame was responsible for the downing of the plane); see also Dugald Baird, 
Rwanda Places Indefinite Ban on BBC Broadcasts Over Genocide Documentary, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jun/01/rwanda-places-
indefinite-ban-on-bbc-broadcasts-over-genocide-documentary [https://perma.cc/23KV-TSZ5] 
(archived Oct. 26, 2017)(describing the “unanimous” decision by a Rwandan regulatory board 
to place an indefinite ban on the BBC’s Kinyarwanda programming). 
293. Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 12-13. See Michele D. Wagner, All the 
Bourgmestre’s Men: Making Sense of Genocide in Rwanda, 45 AFR. TODAY 25, 26 (1998) 
(arguing the author, who eventually became a human rights investigator for Human Rights 
Watch, was labeled a “genocide accomplice” for criticizing RPF retaliation killings). 
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3. Control of Academic Inquiry 
The Kagame regime carefully monitors and restricts what scholars 
say about the country. As is true of the media and civil society sectors, 
the RPF creates its own, sympathetic version of academic inquiry, 
maintaining a stable of scholars who produce “research” that supports 
the government’s historical narrative and legitimacy.294 Relatedly, the 
government requires all incoming university students to attend 
reeducation camps so that they can be thoroughly indoctrinated before 
their studies begin.295 
The government also aggressively restricts academic inquiry that 
might contradict its version of events.296 Susan Thomson, a Canadian 
political scientist and lawyer who now teaches at Colgate University in 
the United States, has chronicled the RPF’s tight monitoring and 
control of her doctoral fieldwork in Rwanda.297 When her findings 
strayed from government-approved themes, her government-assigned 
minders presented her the choice of abandoning her research or 
attending an RPF-controlled reeducation camp.298 She chose the camp, 
a Kafkaesque experience that she later described in a harrowing book 
chapter.299 
																																																																																																																												
294. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 22, 118 (arguing the government 
trains a cadre of Rwandan academics, many employed by the National Commission for the Fight 
Against Genocide (CNLG), to disseminate the approved version of history and attack anyone 
who diverges); see also Newbury, Canonical Convention, supra note 25, at 67-72 (arguing the 
government requires historians to restrict themselves to politically approved narratives and the 
manipulation is “received uncritically” by the academic community within Rwanda). 
295. See infra Part IV.C. 
296. Hintjens, supra note 169, at 88-89; see Freedman, et. al., supra note 144, at 297-308 
(describing the RPF shutting down an NGO-sponsored program on teaching Rwandan history 
when the history teachers strayed from the RPF-approved script). 
297. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 34-42 (arguing the RPF placed tight 
restrictions on her field research and both covertly and overtly monitored her work). 
298. See id. 
299. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 331-32. Not everyone 
agrees that Rwanda punishes foreign academics who criticize it. Many American and European 
academics claim that the regime monitors scholars and excludes them from the country if it 
dislikes their findings. See Danielle de Lame, et. al, Truly Hostile Environment, INYENYERI 
NEWS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.inyenyerinews.org/human-rights/truly-hostile-environment/ 
[https://perma.cc/HJ2E-PEA3] (archived Nov. 6, 2017) (an open letter signed by eleven 
prominent US and European scholars arguing that Rwanda monitors foreign researchers and 
excludes those with which it disagrees); but see Phil Clark, Must Academics Researching 
Authoritarian Regimes Self-Censor?, TIMES HIGHER EDUC., (Nov. 28, 2013), 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/must-academics-researching-authoritarian-
regimes-self-censor/2009275.article [https://perma.cc/RR2A-BW9L] (archived Nov. 6, 2017) 
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C. Using Reeducation Camps to Teach the Government’s Version of 
History 
In 1995, shortly after the genocide, the RPF halted the teaching of 
history in Rwanda’s schools, arguing that the pre-genocide history 
curriculum had portrayed Tutsis inaccurately and negatively and had 
contributed to the slaughter. 300  However, as described in earlier 
sections of this paper, the RPF believes it to be vitally important to 
implant a new version of history that legitimized its own rule.301 It 
therefore, in effect, transferred the task of teaching history to 
institutions that it could more tightly control; namely the state-
controlled media302 and government-run indoctrination camps.303 
There are two general categories of such camps. Solidarity camps, 
or ingando, are primarily for politicians, civil society and church 
leaders, judges, and incoming university students. 304  Reeducation 
camps, or itorero are for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, confessed 
genocidaires, released prisoners, prostitutes, street children and other 
undesirables.305 The camps are organized by Rwanda’s National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (“NURC”) and its sub-body, the 
Program in Civic Education and Conflict Management and Peace 
Building, all staffed by Anglophone returnees.306 Camp sessions last 
anywhere from several days to several weeks, 307  and they tend to 
include a large military presence.308 
The camps’ curriculum focuses on reeducating the population 
about the ethnic unity and peace that existed before colonialism, a time 
when Tutsi and Hutu lived “in peaceful harmony and worked together 
																																																																																																																												
(arguing that some academics exaggerate their peril for self-serving reasons and that the 
Rwandan government generally permits critical scholarship so long as researchers follow proper 
channels). 
300. See Hilker, supra note 137, at 317. 
301. See supra Part III.B.  
302. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
303. Schuberth, supra note 133, at 78, 83; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 75, at 51 
(arguing the government devotes huge resources to teaching its version of history through 
mandatory solidarity camps (ingando) that aim to reeducate the population). 
304. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333-334. 
305. Id; see Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 8-9 (arguing there are two kinds of 
education camps in Rwanda). 
306. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 120. 
307. Id. at 51, 120. 
308. Id. at 120; SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, supra note 272, at 23. 
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for the good of the nation.”309 A key part of that narrative is that all 
Tutsi are victims or survivors, whether they were in the country or not 
at the time of the genocide, and that all Hutu are perpetrators, whether 
or not they participated in the genocide.310Among non-RPF scholars 
who have studied the camps, there is broad consensus that their goal is 
to control public discourse and bolster the RPF’s claim to power, not 
to achieve unity and reconciliation.311 
D. Diffusing the Kagame Regime’s Version of History by Tightly 
Controlling Public Remembrance 
Tourists who visit Rwanda frequently visit the country’s grizzly 
genocide memorials.312All of those I have seen include rooms – often 
inside of churches where massacres took place – displaying heaps of 
the victims’ tattered, bloody clothing, or stains on walls where 
children’s brains were smashed. They also feature the stacked bones of 
thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of victims who were 
murdered nearby. At one particularly macabre site, the Murambi 
Memorial located near Butare in southern Rwanda, as many as 45,000 
victims were slaughtered.313  When the RPF took control and later 
turned the site into a memorial, it filled the compound’s numerous 
outbuildings with complete human remains preserved in lime. 314 
Today, as tourists file through, they can see the horror on the victims’ 
faces and smell the lingering scent of human putrefaction.315 
As with much else that happens in Rwanda today, the Kagame 
regime carefully controls these memorials, and all other public forms 
																																																																																																																												
309. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333 (quoting The 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, 
Exit Strategies (2004)); see supra Part III.B (describing the RPF’s preferred historical narrative). 
310. Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333. 
311. See id. at 332, 337. 
312. See Mona Friedrich & Tony Johnston, Beauty Versus Tragedy: Thanatourism and 
the Memorialization of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, J. of Tourism & Cultural Change 302, 303 
(2013) (arguing Rwanda caters to “grief tourism”); Jens Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288 
(arguing that the Nyamata Memorial, which includes stacks of bleached bones of genocide 
victims, is a “popular stop for visitors”). 
313. Murambi Genocide Memorial Centre, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Murambi_Genocide_Memorial_Centre (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
314. Id. (showing photographs of bleached corpses on display at the memorial). 
315. I base this description on my own experience visiting Murambi during the summers 
of 2013 and 2015. 
2017] MANIPULATING MEMORY IN RWANDA 125 
of remembrance, 316  to ensure that its historical narrative is 
paramount.317 The message is one of emotion, not reason.318 When 
one’s mind is swimming at the horror of smashed, stacked, human 
remains – all caused, at least proximately, by the previous regime – it 
is hard to be critical of the RPF.319 The loud and clear message is “see 
what might happen if you question our methods?” 320  Or, more 
pointedly, “given the horror that you are witnessing, is it not 
understandable that we rule with a heavy hand?” 321  As much as 
memorializing the past, these public sites are designed to compel 
visitors to forget about the authoritarian present.322 To the international 
community, rightly shamed for its inaction in 1994,323 the message is 
“how dare you criticize our human rights record when you stood by and 
allowed this to happen?”324 
It bears mentioning that the regime’s chosen mode of 
memorialization – the display of unburied, indistinguishable remains – 
is starkly out of step with Rwandan custom.325 Rwandans prefer to bury 
their dead near their homes as a way of maintaining contact with 
ancestors.326 Traditionally, the display of human remains was thought 
																																																																																																																												
316. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 7, 153-154 (arguing the government 
requires citizens to participate in various state-sanctioned and led initiatives to commemorate 
the genocide and celebrate national unity and reconciliation); Lisa M. Moore, (Re)Covering the 
Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity, 20 J. OF PUB. 
& INT’L AFF. 47, 54-56 (2009) (similar). 
317. See Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288, 292 (arguing that memorials in Rwanda 
“service privileged memory; that is, memory that is officially sanctioned because it is in 
accordance with the post-genocide raison d’état”, and that private non-sanctioned memorials are 
left to wither); Friedrich & Johnston, supra note 312, at 313-314 (arguing the memorials aim to 
establish a clear narrative approved by the government, one which entirely excludes the memory 
of Hutu suffering and blames the genocide on colonists’ machinations). 
318. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 288. 
319. Id. at 289. 
320. See Thomson, Reeducation for Reconciliation, supra note 144, at 333 (arguing the 
memorial sites are meant to show the end result of ethnic division). 
321 . See SCOTT STRAUS, REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE 292 (2011) (arguing the memorials “justify a repressive 
government by presenting a specter of past violence as a permanent future possibility”).  
322. Id. at 307; Meierhenrich, supra note 21 at 289; see Rachel Ibreck, The Politics of 
Mourning: Survivor Contributions to Memorials in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Memory Studies 
330-331 (2010) (arguing the RPF uses genocide memorials to construct political legitimacy, 
partly by “Tutsification of the genocide”). 
323. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text. 
324. Ibreck, supra note 322, at 172; Moore, supra note 316, at 55. 
325. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 289; STRAUS, supra note 321, at 290. 
326. Meierhenrich, supra note 21, at 290. 
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to conjure a deceased’s spirit, which could cause danger in the temporal 
world. 327  However, as culturally offensive as it may be to most 
Rwandans to stack human remains in memorials, it has been 
enormously successful as a strategy for marketing the genocide and 
controlling its historical narrative.328 
E. Other Means of Controlling History and Memory 
Some critics allege that other government policies, which at first 
blush might seem removed from the realm of collective memory and 
history, are in fact at least partially designed to limit public discourse 
to approved themes. Each of these government programs is worthy of 
independent exploration, but they receive only passing mention here. 
First, some allege that Rwanda’s gacaca courts were motivated in 
part by the regime’s desire to mold public memory concerning the 
genocide. 329  The gacaca courts, which have generated a bountiful 
scholarly literature that is well beyond the scope of this article, were 
advertised as a quasi-traditional, community based system of justice 
that the Kagame regime revived and adapted as a way of clearing the 
enormous backlog of Rwandan citizens (all Hutu, according to the 
RPF) rotting in jail after being accused of participating in the 
genocide. 330  Some commentators praised gacaca as a reasonable 
response to an overwhelming challenge: a necessary if imperfect step 
on the path toward justice and reconciliation. 331  Others harshly 
criticized gacaca courts as lacking due process and enabling score 
settling at local levels. 332 And some pointed out that, although the 
gacaca courts were ostensibly community-based and community-run, 
in fact RPF central authorities tightly controlled their procedures and 
their outcomes so that they explored only regime-approved issues and 
																																																																																																																												
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 289. 
329. Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 9; NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 59. 
330. Straus & Waldorf, supra note 8, at 9. 
331 . See Don Webster, The Uneasy Relationship Between the ICTR and Gacaca, in 
REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 6, at 187 (arguing that, at first, gacaca made sense as an 
expedient way to deal with the backlog of genocide accusations); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
RWANDA EVENTS OF 2009 (2010), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-
chapters/rwanda [https://perma.cc/F7QF-AYBR] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“some Rwandans 
feel the gacaca process has helped reconciliation”). 
332. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA EVENTS OF 2009, supra note 331. 
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established only regime-approved history.333 To take one example, the 
government placed few limits on the gacaca courts’ ability to pursue 
alleged Hutu perpetrators, but it strictly forbade any discussion of 
alleged Tutsi violence.334 
Similarly, commentators claim that Rwanda’s ambitious 
programs of political decentralization and “villagization” are in fact 
thinly veiled mechanisms for controlling social – including historical – 
discourse down to the sub-village level. In recent years, Rwanda has 
redrawn its political boundaries, ostensibly with the purpose of 
devolving government to the grass roots and making local political 
leaders responsive to their communities.335 In fact, according to critics, 
the political reorganization has been used to extend the tentacles of the 
RPF-controlled central government down to the lowest levels of 
Rwandan society.336 This in turn has permitted the government to better 
control all public, and even private, discourse affecting public memory 
and history.337 
Closely tied to political reorganization is the Kagame regime’s 
program of “villagization,” or imidugudu,338 which compels339 rural 
Rwandans, most of whom are subsistence farmers who traditionally 
live in scattered family compounds,340 to move into centrally planned 
villages. In the face of sustained criticism from the international donor 
																																																																																																																												
333. NYIRUBUGARA, supra note 127, at 59. 
334. Id. at 59-60. 
335 . Bert Ingelaere, The Ruler’s Drum and the People’s Shout: Accountability and 
Representation on Rwanda’s Hills, in REMAKING RWANDA, supra note 7, at 68. 
336. Id; THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 15-19; see SUNDARAM, BAD NEWS, 
supra note 272, at 56 (arguing the RPF has used political reorganization as means to replace 
local leaders with people loyal to the military, so now the military exercises tight control down 
to the grassroots); see also Huggins, supra note 270, at 39 (arguing ostensible efforts to involve 
local stakeholders are in fact “sensitization” meetings to publicize decisions that have already 
been made by the central government). 
337. THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 19, 22. 
338. See Ingelaere, supra note 335, at 69 (arguing political decentralization happened in 
tandem with “villagization”). 
339. See Bruce, supra note 10, at 130 (arguing the government claimed no one would be 
compelled to move into villages but in fact villagization was compulsory); Newbury, High 
Modernism, supra note 9, at 224, 234 (arguing villagization is based on top-down authority and 
involves substantial coercion). 
340. Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 224; Ann-Sofie Isaksson, Manipulating 
the Rural Landscape: Villagization and Income Generation in Rwanda, Working Papers in 
Economics, no. 510, University of Gothenburg 1, 4 (June 2011). 
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community, 341  and in spite of the disastrous history in Africa and 
elsewhere of forced land relocation schemes,342 the RPF has forged 
forward, insisting that “villagization” was a vital element of its plans 
to make Rwanda more economically efficient. 343  Critics, however, 
claim that at least one purpose of “villagization” is to bring citizens into 
a collective space so that central authorities can more easily monitor 
what they say and do.344 
F. Summary of the Kagame Regime’s Methods and Description of 
the Results 
The Kagame regime in Rwanda has constructed a comprehensive 
legal and extralegal scaffolding that enables it to control public 
discourse and ensure that only its approved, self-justifying version of 
collective memory endures. It aggressively pursues and punishes all 
who express “genocide ideology” and defines that and similar crimes 
so loosely that it is free to silence anyone who dissents from the official 
narrative. It uses legal and extralegal means to control the media, civil 
society, and scholarly inquiry. It has removed the teaching of history 
from schools and transferred that function to government-controlled 
indoctrination camps and government-controlled media. It exercises 
tight control over public remembrance of the 1994 genocide and insists 
																																																																																																																												
341. See Bruce, supra note 10, at 130-131 (arguing NGOs began opposing villagization in 
1998, soon after it began); Isaksson, supra note 340, at 5 (arguing Rwanda’s government 
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342. Newbury, High Modernism, supra note 10, at 224; see Isaksson, supra note 340, at 1 
(arguing that previous villagization schemes, including in Tanzania and Ethiopia, negatively 
impacted agricultural productivity). 
343. Bruce, supra note 10, at 130; Isaksson, supra note 340, at 1, 5; Geoffrey Payne, Land 
Issues in The Rwanda’s Post Conflict Law Reform, in LOCAL CASE STUDIES IN AFRICAN LAND 
LAW 29 (Robert Home, ed. 2011). 
344. See THOMSON, WHISPERING, supra note 76, at 121 (arguing the RPF uses the lowest 
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this order by routinely arresting and indefinitely detaining street people and other 
“undesirables,” essentially warehousing them in so-called “transit centers,” lest they contradict 
the regime’s narrative about easing poverty in post-genocide Rwanda. Rwanda: Locking Up 
the Poor: New Findings of Arbitrary Detention, Ill-Treatment in “Transit Centers,” 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 21, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/21/rwanda-
locking-poor [https://perma.cc/QGC5-4XDW] (archived Nov. 9, 2017).  
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upon grizzly, culturally inappropriate memorials that emphasize the 
horror that might ensue if anyone questions its authority. Finally, it has 
compelled its citizens to uproot their lives and move into newly formed 
villages, and has devolved its own power down to the sub-village level, 
arguably to enhance its ability to control public discourse. 
Not surprisingly, these laws and policies have resulted in 
numerous high profile instances in which the government has silenced 
dissenters.345 The regime has pursued journalists, civil society actors 
and politicians for straying – even obliquely – from the government’s 
approved script.346 
One infamous incident involved the 2010 arrest and imprisonment 
of Victoire Ingabire, an opposition politician who returned to Rwanda 
intending to run for president against Paul Kageme but who was 
quickly arrested and silenced.347 Although later convicted of numerous 
offenses including organizing an armed insurrection – convictions that 
human rights organizations claim were based on fatally flawed 
trials348– her initial arrest was based on the fact that she contradicted 
the regime’s historical narrative by stating in a public address that Hutu 
citizens – not exclusively Tutsis – were killed during the 1994 
genocide.349 
At around the same time, the government arrested and convicted 
a journalist, Agnes Uwimana Nkusi for, among other things, writing 
about “ethnicism” and “regionalism” and claiming that they led 
Rwandans to end up “killing each other.”350 This statement offended 
the Kagame regime by implying that ethnicity is in fact a salient issue 
																																																																																																																												
345. See supra note 280. 
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348. See id. 
349. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing 
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L7TH-E38C] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). 
350. Le Ministère Public v. Uwimana Nkusi (Apr. 4, 2012), Case No. RPA 0061/11/CS 
(Rwanda, Afr.), summary available at https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/
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in Rwanda and, worse yet, that Tutsis – presumably RPF soldiers – had 
been involved in unjustified killings.351 For those utterances she was 
convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and fined for 
“genocide minimization.” 352  For other related offenses, including 
writing that President Kagame’s policies favored his own clan, that 
high level jobs were reserved for only certain people (presumably 
meaning Anglophone Tutsis), and that the army was enriching itself 
through its proxy wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo,353 she 
was convicted of “threatening national security,” “divisionism,” and 
“defaming the President,” all of which added more fines and seven 
additional years to her sentence.354 
In a further, almost comical, sign of the government’s 
determination to control public discourse, especially regarding topics 
related to the genocide, in 2012 it arrested a radio announcer and 
charged him with “genocide ideology” after he mistakenly mixed up 
the terms for “victims” and “survivors” when discussing the 
genocide.355 He spent three months in jail before being acquitted and 
released.356 
Even in the face of condemnation by international human rights 
organizations, and even after vowing to reconsider some of the laws 
that restrict expression,357 the Rwandan government has continued to 
vigorously pursue and punish those who contradict its narrative. One 
recent example involved Kizito Mihigo, a well-known Rwandan singer 
who in 2014 was arrested, convicted and sentenced to ten years’ 




353. See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detentions, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its 
Sixty-Fourth Sessions, 27-31 August 2012 (Nov. 22, 2012), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/wgad/25-
2012.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/6EW5-ERN3] (archived Oct. 26, 2017). 
354. Id; Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 280. 
355. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: EIGHT-YEAR SENTENCE FOR 
OPPOSITION LEADER, supra note 347; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND 
REALITY, supra note 241, at 40 (describing a Rwandan citizen who in 2007 challenged a tenet 
of the official “truth” about RPF war crimes and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for 
“gross minimization of the genocide”). 
356. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: EIGHT-YEAR SENTENCE FOR OPPOSITION 
LEADER, supra note 347. 
357. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 8. 
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victims of the genocide as well as for victims of other violence.”358 
Apparently, the government determined that the singer’s reference to 
“other violence” implied that Rwandans other than Tutsis had 
suffered.359 
These are only a few high-profile examples of the Kagame 
regime’s legal and extralegal pursuit of perceived opponents, 
particularly those who openly question its carefully constructed self-
justifying historical narrative.360 However, it should not be forgotten 
that the government carefully monitors and controls ordinary Rwandan 
citizens361 and punishes those who stray from the party line.362 Human 
rights organizations have documented countless arrests, prosecutions, 
disappearances, and assassinations – both inside and outside Rwanda – 
of Rwandan citizens from all strata of society that the government 
perceives as enemies.363 As others have pointed out, it does not take 
many assassinations, disappearances, or convictions before society at 
large gets the message that it is safer not to stray from the government’s 
approved narrative.364 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Rwanda is not the only country in the world that distorts history 
and manipulates collective memory. One need look no further than the 
United States, where legislators from Texas, Oklahoma and Georgia 
have passed laws in recent years that in effect require history teachers 
to emphasize American exceptionalism, patriotism, and respect for 
authority365 while deemphasizing the US’s troubled racial history.366 
Rwanda’s manipulation of collective memory and history, 
however, is on a different scale. In the United States, attempts at ham-
handed historical distortion tend to emanate from the boondocks. When 
regional political powers succeed in altering history textbooks, the 
national discourse, led by vocal cognoscenti and backed by a stalwart 
First Amendment and a vibrant independent press, hoots in derision 
and portrays the would-be “memory entrepreneurs” as ignorant yokels. 
In Rwanda, the manipulation of history and collective memory is 
carried on by a sophisticated and determined executive that is 
unchecked by other branches of government and that aggressively 
silences anyone who dares dissent.367 
For the time being, Paul Kagame and his ruling coterie can take 
heart that their policy of memory entrepreneurship seems to be 
working. It is rare that anyone in Rwanda contradicts any aspect of the 
regime’s ahistorical version collective memory.368 When Rwandans 
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speak of the past,369 they hew rigidly to the party line: pre-colonial 
Rwanda was a peaceful country in which ethnic divisions were absent; 
a wise monarch ruled benevolently; the Belgians introduced ethnic 
division and taught Rwandans to hate each other; the 1994 genocide 
was perpetrated exclusively by hate-filled Hutus against Tutsis; Paul 
Kagame and the RPF halted the genocide and are blameless for civilian 
killings; the Kagame regime has the moral authority to lead the country 
into the future.370 
 Rwandans’ eerie consistency is a result of the government’s 
comprehensive, mostly successful, legal and extralegal efforts to 
impose a single collective memory on them, one carefully constructed 
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